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Abstract
The three chapters in this dissertation examine aspects of the relationships between trans-
parency, government accountability, and the quality of public services. In the first chapter,
I ask how ethnic diversity, or lack thereof, among polling station officials affects voting
outcomes. I exploit a natural experiment occurring in the 2014 parliamentary elections in
India, where the government mandated the random assignment of state employees to the
teams that managed polling stations on election day. I find that the presence of officers of
minority identities within teams led to significant shifts in vote share toward the political
parties associated with these groups. Results suggest that the magnitude of these effects
is large enough to be relevant to election outcomes. Using large-scale survey experiments,
I provide evidence of own-group favoritism in polling personnel and identify the process
of voter identity verification as an important channel through which voting outcomes are
impacted.
The second chapter examines whether electronic procurement (e-procurement), which
increases access to information and reduces personal interactions with potentially corrupt
officials, improves procurement outcomes in India and Indonesia. We find no evidence
of reduced prices but do find that e-procurement leads to quality improvements in both
countries. Regions with e-procurement are also more likely to have winners come from
outside the region. On net, the results suggest that e-procurement facilitates entry from
higher quality contractors.
The third chapter studies the effects of the enactment across U.S. states of open meetings
laws which ostensibly increase the public availability of information on legislator behavior.
iii
As recent work shows that increased remoteness of capital cities in U.S. states is strongly as-
sociated with reduced accountability and worse government performance, I also investigate
how the impacts of open meetings vary with state capital isolation. I find that open meetings
increase spending on public goods and heighten confidence in state government on average.
Heterogeneous impacts on incumbent vote share suggest that at both low and high levels
of initial accountability, open meetings provide citizens with additional information that
influences voting decisions.
iv
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Introduction
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I ask how ethnic diversity, or lack thereof, in the
teams of officers that manage polling stations on election day affects voting outcomes. I take
advantage of a natural experiment in the Indian electoral setting in which government em-
ployees were randomly assigned to teams of polling station officials, generating exogenous
variation in team composition in terms of religious and caste identity, both of which are
strongly connected with political affiliation.
I use detailed polling station location information and unique officer assignment data
for two districts in the state of Bihar covering more than 5.6 million registered voters in the
2014 national elections. I identify both direct effects within stations and spillover effects
across stations of changes in team religious and caste composition on voting outcomes,
demonstrating that the direct effects alone would be a biased estimate of the total impact.
To go further and shed light on underlying mechanisms, I embedded experiments in
surveys of individuals randomly selected from the same populations of election officers
and registered voters that were exposed to the election policy experiment. These data allow
me to test for election officer bias and determine whether such bias leads to differential
treatment of voters on election day.
I find strong evidence that own-group bias in election officers exists and influences the
treatment of potential voters on election day. Using a vignette experiment in which polling
station officers assess the likelihood that a hypothetical individual would be allowed to
vote, I find that officers are significantly more likely to favorably assess the individual’s
qualification to vote when they are of the same religious/caste-group type. In addition,
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the results of list experiments show that election officers treated potential voters differently
based on religion/caste and explicitly attempted to influence citizens’ voting behavior.
Consistent with the experimental results, I also find that minority potential voters at
polling stations with no minority officers are on average significantly less satisfied with their
overall polling station experience and less likely to be able to vote than are non-minority
individuals. These effects disappear, however, at polling stations with minority officers
present or when individuals possess a government-issued voter identity card, a method of
identification which reduces officer discretion in determining voter eligibility. Furthermore,
I confirm that the polling-station-level effects of team composition on voting outcomes are
concentrated in areas with lower voter identity card coverage.
Counterfactual calculations indicate that the combined direct and indirect team com-
position effects are large enough to influence the outcomes of elections. Given that the
two major political coalitions in this setting strongly differ in their propensities to field
Muslim candidates, this also suggests that changes in officer team assignment could lead to
significant shifts in the Muslim proportion of officeholders.
Fair and well-functioning elections are critical to maintaining the responsiveness of
elected officials to citizens in democracies. While the related literature on election reforms
has focused in large part on the benefits of advances in monitoring and voting technology,
this paper is to my knowledge the first to provide rigorous evidence of the remaining impor-
tance of the identities of local-level election personnel. Indian elections are technologically
advanced and their administration is highly regulated, indicating that bias in discretionary
decision making of polling station officers can undermine the quality of service provision
even at the present frontier of election practice.
The second chapter examines the impacts of the transition by developing country gov-
ernments to electronic procurement (e-procurement) of goods and services. E-procurement
can potentially address three common concerns with manual procurement practices: lack of
access to bid information, collusion among bidders, and corruption. However, it is plausible
that in low income settings, where information technology coverage and other aspects of
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state capacity remain low, e-procurement can only effect limited change and can potentially
make things worse.
We examine the impact of electronic procurement on public works projects in two large
emerging economies: India and Indonesia. In India, we examine procurement practices for
a federally funded rural road construction program which is implemented by state road
departments. In Indonesia, we examine contract data from the national Ministry of Public
Works for both construction and consulting (e.g., engineering management and design)
contracts each year. The gradual roll-out of e-procurement (at the state-level in India and
province-level in Indonesia) allows for a difference-in-differences strategy: We compare
outcomes in states/provinces before and after the adoption of e-procurement, as well as in
those continuing under manual procurement practices, allowing us to quantify the benefits
or costs of the practice in both countries.
For both countries, we obtained administrative data on the complete universe of contracts
from before and after e-procurement by scraping publicly available information from
respective government websites. In addition, in India, we hand collected bidding data on
tenders for four states which we use to supplement the administrative data.
We first show that, in both India and Indonesia, e-procurement increases the probability
that the winning bidder comes from outside the region where the contract takes place.
This is consistent with e-procurement decreasing the costs of submitting bids for those not
physically present. We next examine the impact on the ultimate outcomes of interest: price,
quality of construction, and timeliness.
We find no systematic evidence that electronic procurement lowers prices paid by
the government. In contrast, e-procurement led to quality improvements, albeit along
different dimensions in the two countries. A first measure of quality is time-overrun in
project completion. In India, we observe no statistically significant changes in late works,
while in Indonesia these declines are large and significant. A separate indicator of quality,
only available for India, is an independent audit report on construction quality, which
was conducted identically in roads completed under both e-procurement and traditional
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procurement. According to this measure, we find that e-procurement leads to higher quality
roads.
We then explore the degree to which the results are driven by improving outcomes
among already winning bidders, as opposed to changing who wins. We find that after
e-procurement, winning contractors in India tend to be those who have higher quality on av-
erage. In Indonesia, we find evidence that those contractors who win after e-procurement are
systematically less likely to be late. This suggests that a key mechanism for e-procurement is
allowing higher quality contractors to enter and win projects, rather than simply encouraging
better performance from an existing set of contractors.
The fact that we observe changes on the quality margin, and that it occurs through
changing which contractors win rather than the performance of a given set of winning
contracts, suggests that the system prior to e-procurement was not necessarily selecting the
most efficient firms, and that e-procurement may have improved efficiency even if it did
not necessarily lower prices paid. It also suggests that the practice of giving contracts to
the lowest price bidder likely contributed to greater inefficiencies on the quality margin.
Overall, our findings provide qualified support to the view that e-governance can improve
the provision of public services.
The third chapter provides empirical evidence on the effects of increased transparency
of the actions of elected representatives in the U.S. state legislative setting. Increases in
institutional transparency in democracies are commonly assumed to improve outcomes
of policy making. While proponents of greater transparency emphasize the benefits of
increased accountability and responsiveness of elected representatives, theory suggests that
greater transparency need not lead to beneficial consequences for the general public. For
example, it may be that, in contexts where it is difficult for the public to evaluate fully the
consequences of representatives’ choices, increasing observability of the actions themselves
may increase the incentives of representatives to disregard valuable private information
when choosing what to do. Given the theoretical uncertainty, an empirical investigation
is valuable in helping to improve our understanding of which of the potential forces are
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dominant in U.S. state legislatures.
I exploit variation in the timing of enactment of open meetings laws across U.S. states
and employ a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. I examine the impact of open
meetings on the total numbers of bills introduced and enacted and on the timeliness with
which the state budget, arguably the most important piece of legislative output, is delivered.
As a more direct measure of whether legislators are incentivized to take actions with
important economic impacts, state government expenditure is considered as an outcome. I
finally examine how open meetings influence citizens’ perceptions of government and their
behavior in elections to state legislatures.
In addition to considering the average impacts of open meetings on these outcomes, I
investigate how the effects are mediated by the level of geographic isolation of the state
legislature from its constituents, which recent work has shown to be robustly associated
with weaker accountability and worse government performance. The effects of increasing
transparency through open meetings may then differ in the isolation of the state government,
due to differences across states both in the baseline level of quality of government and in the
effective magnitude of the change in public informedness associated with open meetings.
I find that open meetings decrease legislative enactments, but do not impact the number
of bills introduced or timeliness of budgets on average. Results suggest that open meetings
significantly increase expenditure on public goods, and that these expenditure effects are
concentrated in areas with greater state capital isolation, where government spending on
public goods is lower to begin with.
Open meetings also shift citizens’ perceptions of state government, such that in national-
level Gallup surveys they are significantly more likely to express at least moderate confidence
in the government on average. An examination of heterogeneity in impacts by capital
isolation shows that the effects are driven by gains in low isolation areas. In states with more
isolated capitals, open meetings actually increase the proportion of respondents choosing
the lowest possible measure of confidence. Mirroring this pattern, I observe significant
differences in the impact of open meetings on voting outcomes by the isolation of the capital.
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Whereas incumbents in low isolation locations see their vote shares increase with open
meetings, those where the capital is more remote experience a decrease in vote share.
The findings of this chapter suggest that open meetings in the U.S. state legislative
setting are on average beneficial. Expenditure on public goods increases, concentrated
in areas where spending of this type is the lowest to start. Additionally, citizens express
greater confidence in the ability of state governments. The results also indicate that, even in
environments with low initial levels of accountability, open meetings lead to shifts in voters’
information and that they respond to its content. That is, weak transmission mechanisms to
the public or low uptake by citizens do not appear to be binding constraints which prevent
increased accessibility of information about legislator behavior from producing downstream
effects.
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Chapter 1
Enfranchising Your Own?
Experimental Evidence on Polling
Officer Identity and Electoral
Outcomes in India
1.1 Introduction
Electoral malpractice and election day violence are common problems across the world,
as the most recent round of the World Values Survey shows.1 Figure 1.1 shows that at
least twenty-five percent of respondents in more than one half of survey countries indicate
that violence at the polling station is often a problem, and in nearly three quarters of
countries that election officials are often unfair. The provision of well-functioning elections
constitutes a critical public service. The ability of a country’s citizens to cast votes in a free
and fair setting is desirable in its own right, but is additionally important to the extent
1Round 6 was administered to representative samples of individuals across sixty countries between 2010
and 2014, but in only forty-two were election-related questions asked. This round was the first to include such
questions.
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that it increases the accountability of elected officials, with subsequent impacts on policy
decisions and citizen welfare (Besley and Case 1993, Maskin and Tirole 2004).
Election management and voting technology vary widely across countries, including a
fundamental aspect of electoral administration, the staffing of polling stations on election
day. Volunteers manage polling stations in the United States, while in Argentina randomly
selected citizens work as polling station officials within their own municipalities. In India
polling officials are randomly drawn from pools of government employees, and in Kenya
polling officers are temporary, paid positions staffed through an open application process.
Given the variety in election administration across countries and the frequent dissatisfaction
of citizens with elections, there is clear need for causal evidence on what works in election
reforms, particularly in relation to personnel management.
In this paper, I ask how ethnic diversity, or lack thereof, in the teams of officers that
manage polling stations on election day affects voting outcomes. I take advantage of a
natural experiment in the Indian electoral setting in which government employees were
randomly assigned to teams of polling station officials. The government’s assignment
method generates random variation in team composition in terms of religious and caste
identity, both of which are strongly connected with political affiliation. Largely in opposition
to upper-caste Hindu influence, Muslims and Yadavs (a low-caste Hindu group) formed a
political alliance in the state of Bihar in the mid-1990s, and this coalition remained operative
in the most recent 2014 national elections.2 The teams of officers I study contained at least
one Muslim or Yadav approximately one third of the time, allowing me to identify the
causal impacts of shifting from a “homogeneous” to “mixed” team of officers at a polling
station.3
The random assignment circumvents otherwise confounding issues of selection in
election officer placement at polling stations. A government may assign election personnel
2Wittsoe (2013) provides a detailed account of the state of the alliance over time.
3Due to the low proportions of Muslims and Yadavs among officers, teams that are fully Muslim/Yadav are
not observed in my sample.
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Notes: Measures computed using World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014). “Election officials often unfair” is
the weighted percentage of respondents in each country, when asked “In your view, how often do the following
things occur in this country’s elections?”, answering “Not at all often” or “Not often” to “Election officials are
fair”, against the alternatives of “Very often”, “Fairly often”, or “Don’t know/Not answer”. “Often violence at
polls” is the percentage answering “Very often” or “Fairly often” to “Voters are threatened with violence at the
polls.” “Votes often counted unfairly” is the percentage answering “Not at all often” or “Not often” to “Votes
are counted fairly.”
Figure 1.1: Election administration difficulties by country
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with greater experience to manage more troubled locations in an effort to maintain neutrality.
Alternatively, the ruling party may station supporters as officers in strategically important
areas to influence outcomes in their favor. In either case, the assignment of officers would
be endogenous to voting behavior. Conditional on the integrity of the randomization, which
I test and confirm, the setting considered in this paper is not subject to issues of this type.
An additional benefit of the study context is that the polling officer assignment policy had
already been in place statewide for a decade at the time of the election under consideration,
eliminating concerns that the estimated impacts reflect only partial equilibrium effects that
may disappear once the policy is brought to full scale or as the government and political
parties adjust to the change over time (Acemoglu 2010, Svensson and Yanagizawa-Drott
2012).
I study two districts in Bihar covering more than 5.6 million registered voters across
5,561 polling stations for the 2014 national elections. Using detailed polling station location
information and unique officer assignment data, I identify both the direct effects within
stations and the spillover effects across stations of changes in team religious and caste
composition on voting outcomes. The omission of these cross-station effects could potentially
bias the estimates of overall impact.
To go further and shed light on underlying mechanisms, I embedded experiments in
surveys of individuals randomly selected from the same populations of election officers
and potential voters that were exposed to the election policy experiment.4 These data allow
me to test for election officer bias and determine whether such bias leads to differential
treatment of voters on election day.
This paper has three main results. First, I find that changes in team composition affect
voting both within and across polling stations. The average vote share margin between the
two major political coalitions is reduced on average by 2.3 percentage points, or 12.7 percent,
when the officer team at a given polling station is mixed. This shift is driven by a significant
4“Potential voter” refers to registered voters who went to the polling station on election day with the
intention of voting.
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4.6 percent increase in votes for the minority-oriented coalition and a 4.1 percent decrease
in votes for the non-minority coalition. In addition, I find that having a neighboring station
that is mixed rather than homogeneous decreases the vote share margin by an average of 2.6
percentage points, demonstrating that the direct effects alone would be an underestimate of
the total impact.
Second, I find strong evidence that own-group bias in election officers exists and in-
fluences the treatment of potential voters on election day. I measure bias using a vignette
experiment in which polling station officers assess the likelihood that a hypothetical in-
dividual would be allowed to vote, based on a description where all information is held
constant across respondents with the exception of the individual’s name, which is varied
randomly. Officers are 10 percentage points, or 25 percent, more likely to favorably assess
the individual’s qualification to vote when they are of the same religious/caste-group type.
In addition, I find using separate list experiments that approximately 20 to 25 percent of
officer and potential voter respondents agree that election officers treated potential voters
differently based on religion/caste on election day, and roughly 5 to 10 percent that officers
explicitly attempted to influence individuals’ voting behavior.
Consistent with the experimental results, I find that Muslim/Yadav potential voters
at polling stations with no minority officers are on average significantly less satisfied
with their overall polling station experience and less likely to be able to vote than are
non-Muslim/Yadav individuals. These effects disappear, however, at mixed team polling
stations or when individuals possess a government-issued voter identity card, a method of
identification which reduces officer discretion in determining voter eligibility. Furthermore,
I confirm that the previously identified polling-station-level effects of team composition on
voting outcomes are concentrated in areas with lower voter identity card coverage. Taken
together my results suggest that religious/caste diversity within officer teams and the
reduction of the scope for discretion in officer duties function as substitutes in improving
the impartiality of election proceedings.
Third, I ask whether the combined direct and indirect team composition effects are large
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enough to influence the outcomes of elections. Under reasonable assumptions, estimates
from counterfactual calculations indicate that alternative officer assignment mechanisms
would have changed the identity of the winning coalition in approximately 5 to 15 percent
of races in the most recent national and state elections in Bihar. Given that the two major
political coalitions strongly differ in their propensities to field Muslim candidates, these
changes in election outcomes would have led to approximately a 25 percent increase in
Muslim officeholders. Recent work finds that in India the election of Muslim legislators
significantly improves child health and education outcomes (Bhalotra et al. 2014), further
suggesting how officer team composition can have downstream effects on citizen well-being.
This paper complements the literature examining technology-centered approaches to
strengthening elections. While technological innovations in the election setting have been
shown to significantly impact electoral fraud (Callen et al. 2015), voter turnout (Marx et al.
2014), and even subsequent public service delivery and health (Fujiwara 2015), less progress
has been made in understanding, holding the electoral setting otherwise constant, how the
identities of election personnel may still matter.
My results additionally relate to work which finds that election observers reduce fraud
at their posted polling stations when they represent non-politically affiliated international
or domestic organizations (Hyde 2007, Ichino and Schündlen 2012), but may introduce
additional bias when they themselves have partisan preferences (Casas et al. 2014). While
this literature considers individuals external to the government who are explicitly tasked
with monitoring polling stations, I focus on the government agents responsible for managing
election proceedings themselves.
This paper also contributes to the body of research studying the negative impacts of
ethnic fractionalization on government decision making and the provision of public goods
(Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et al. 1999, Miguel 2004, Miguel and Gugerty 2005,
Shayo and Zusman 2011). I provide micro-econometric evidence on an additional area, the
administration of elections, in which heterogeneity in the ethnic composition of a population
can lead to adverse effects on the quality of public service provision.
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Finally, the implications of my work are also relevant to a literature examining potential
discrimination against blacks and hispanics in the American electoral system. Recent
research suggests that minorities in the US have different procedural experiences at polling
stations on election day (Ansolabehere 2009, Atkeson et al. 2010, Cobb et al. 2012), have
poorer perceptions of poll worker job performance (Hall et al. 2009), and receive lower
quality information from local election administrators in response to requests about voting
requirements (Faller et al. 2015). In addition, a 2014 U.S. government study states that “one
of the signal weaknesses of the system of election administration in the United States is
the absence of a dependable, well-trained corps of poll workers” (PCEA 2014). My results
further underscore the relevance of dimensions of voter identity such as ethnicity to the
quality of election-related service provision by local-level bureaucrats.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on the historical
and institutional context of the study, while Section 1.3 presents a conceptual framework.
Section 1.4 describes the data and performs a randomization check. Section 1.5 presents
the reduced-form impacts of team composition on voting outcomes. Section 1.6 provides
empirical evidence on causal mechanisms. Section 1.7 considers alternative explanations
and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Religion, caste, and politics
Over the last two decades, the dominant political parties in state-level politics in Bihar have
been the RJD, BJP, and JDU. The RJD has traditionally enjoyed the support of an alliance
between Muslims and Yadavs, a lower-caste Hindu group, which arose in large part in
the mid-1990s in an attempt to counter upper-caste Hindu influence in the state (Wittsoe
2013). Muslims and Yadavs are sizeable constituencies in Bihar, making up approximately
17 percent and 14 percent of the population of registered voters, respectively (CSDS 2010).
Between 2005 and 2013, the BJP and JDU parties were joined in a political alliance. The
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BJP was primarily supported by upper-caste Hindus, while the JDU relied more on the
support of non-Yadav lower castes. The BJP-JDU alliance dissolved in the run up to the 2014
parliamentary election and, as a result, religion and caste were widely considered of high
electoral relevance (Anuja 2013, Bhaskar 2013, Rukmini 2014).
The RJD and BJP subsequently each formed coalitions with other political parties and
the JDU contested alone. Members within each coalition agreed prior to the elections not to
field candidates in the same races. As upper-castes are less than 15 percent of the population
in Bihar, the BJP increased its efforts to court low-caste Hindu voters. Post-polls for the 2014
elections indicate that only 19 percent of Muslims and 2 percent of Yadavs voted for the BJP
coalition, while approximately 78 percent of upper-caste Hindus and more than 50 percent
of other low-caste groups did so. Correspondingly, only 5 percent of upper castes and 10
percent of other low-caste groups, but 64 percent of both Muslims and Yadavs, voted for the
RJD coalition (Kumar 2014a).
Given the strong connections between religious and caste identity and party affiliation,
non-Muslim/Yadav officers are expected on average to be relatively politically inclined
toward the BJP coalition over the RJD coalition, and vice versa for Muslim/Yadav officers.
Section 1.3 discusses the channels through which shifting from a homogeneous to mixed
polling officer team in terms of religious/caste composition may influence voting outcomes.
I hereafter refer to the coalitions as simply the RJD and the BJP.
1.2.2 Administrative structure and randomized officer assignment
Bihar, with a population of roughly 100 million, is the third largest state in India and
divided into 40 parliamentary constituencies (PCs), single member jurisdictions electing
representatives to the national parliament via plurality rule. The PCs are further sub-divided
into 243 assembly constituencies (sub-constituencies), each of which contains roughly 250
polling stations on average (see Figure 1.2). Registered voters receive a specific polling
station assignment for each election and are only able to cast a vote at that station. Parallel
to the electoral structure, the state’s bureaucratic structure is divided into 38 districts. PCs
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Notes: Shaded area in the figure indicates the extent of an example parliamentary constituency.
Figure 1.2: Polling station distribution across example parliamentary constituency
and districts often, but not always, fully overlap.5
A polling station is managed on election day by a presiding officer and typically three
or four polling officers with distinct administrative responsibilities, detailed below.6 Prior to
elections, each district uses a proprietary government software program to randomly draw
5District administrators are responsible for managing election personnel assignment in those sub-
constituencies falling within their districts.
6Four polling officers are assigned to polling stations with greater than 1200 registered voters in rural areas
and 1400 registered voters in urban areas (21.1 percent of polling stations), and only two polling officers are
assigned to polling station with fewer than 500 registered voters (0.7 percent of polling stations). In the case of
four polling officers, the fourth polling officer shares the duties of the second polling officer. In the case of two
polling officers, the presiding officer additionally assumes the duties of the third polling officer.
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120 percent of the total number of required officers. Each polling team position has a distinct
district-level pool of state government employees from which the officers are selected. After
the completion of polling duty training, a subset of the individuals in each position pool are
randomly assigned to a polling officer team in a designated sub-constituency. Officers are
not assigned to sub-constituencies where they are registered to vote or are employed full
time. The randomization is conducted in the presence of official observers assigned by the
national office of the Election Commission of India (ECI), no more than seven days prior to
election day.
A second randomization is conducted in which polling teams are assigned to specific
polling stations. This assignment occurs the day prior to deployment of the teams to polling
stations, timed so that they arrive the night before the election and no one has advance
knowledge of who the officers at a given polling station will be. The software program also
automatically generates team rosters with photographs in .pdf format.
1.2.3 Polling station procedures
Polling station officials are transported together in teams from the district headquarters
to their polling stations, making officer absence relatively conspicuous and easy to track.
This centralized transport, as well as the automated generation of officer rosters with
photographs, also makes it more difficult for officers to report to a polling station different
than that to which they were officially assigned or to have someone else impersonate them.
If officers are absent from assigned duty without a documented excuse, they are subject to
punishment by the ECI. Despite the attempts of the ECI to impose high costs on officers
for non-compliance, it may still be that some proportion of officers do not report to their
assigned polling stations on election day.7 To the extent that this occurs, the estimates in
this paper can be interpreted as intent-to-treat effects.
On election day, potential voters wait in line at their polling station and sequentially
7Official attendance data is not available, but the election officer survey results indicate that officers are
absent from duty very infrequently.
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interact with the first through third polling officers. The first polling officer verifies individ-
uals’ identities against the official list of registered voters, which has each individual’s name,
age, and, when available, a relative’s name, voter identity card number, and photograph.
Once a voter successfully confirms her identity with the first officer, her name is read out
to the rest of the team. The second polling officer then stamps her finger with ink so that
she may not vote more than once, obtains her signature or thumb impression in the official
register, and gives her a paper slip with a serial number designating the order in which the
voting compartment may be entered. The third officer then checks the voter’s finger for ink,
allows her into the voting compartment, and activates the electronic voting machine so that
a single vote may be cast. Potential voters at the polling station do not necessarily interact
with the presiding officer, who is tasked with the overall management and supervision of
station activities.
1.2.4 Election fraud and policy responses
The problem of “booth capturing”, as it is commonly known in India, in which a polling
station comes under the control of a political party on election day, was a widespread
occurrence as recently as the 2004 national elections (Rohde 2004).8 The ECI implemented
a number of policies in an effort to stem this type of election fraud. Elections may be
staggered over multiple weeks across different regions within a state to maximize the
available coverage of central police and paramilitary forces, observers, and camera recording
equipment at sensitive locations. Additionally, electronic voting machines (EVMs), which
were first used in Bihar during a 2004 nationwide rollout to all state and national assembly
elections, were adopted under the general assumption that they are more secure than the
8Capturing may take place in a relatively peaceful manner, with local leaders standing near the voting
machine to instruct voters on their choice of candidate and making their decisions public to a nearby crowd
of supporters. Votes may also be cast for absent citizens and certain groups may be prevented from voting.
Alternatively, more violent methods may be employed, with armed individuals hired by parties taking control
of a polling station to cast false votes or steal the ballot box, or using explosives and gunfire to reduce turnout
(Wittsoe 2013).
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traditional paper ballot.9 For instance, EVMs have a maximum rate allowed of five votes
per minute, meant to increase the difficulty of casting large numbers of false votes, and are
more difficult to transport and counterfeit than ballot boxes.
The multi-stage randomized assignment of polling station teams was employed state
wide in Bihar beginning in 2004, and has since been adopted nation-wide, covering more
than 814 million registered voters across 543 parliamentary constituencies. Among the
assumed benefits of the adoption of randomization was a weakened ability of political
parties to coordinate ahead of time with polling station officials or identify which locations
would be the easiest targets for capture. These policies are generally viewed as having
been successful in reducing the frequency of outright booth capturing. However, issues
potentially remain with biased election officer behavior on election day or types of electoral
fraud that occur in the longer term prior to elections, such as vote buying or intimidation. I
focus in this paper on the former.
1.3 Team composition: channels of impact
1.3.1 Within-station effects
In a setting where officers may engage in biased behavior at the polling station, a change
from homogeneous to mixed team composition could influence voting outcomes through a
“checks and balances” channel. Polling station officials have two sets of duties on election
day: administration of the identity verification and voting process; and maintenance of
a neutral environment in the area immediately surrounding the station. In addition, the
connection of religion and caste with political affiliation is well known in this setting and
potential voter type is observable to election officers.10 Given their own preferences, officers
may then wish to treat potential voters at the polling station differently based on religion
and caste, in an effort to influence either ability to vote or choice of candidate conditional
9For a criticism of this assumption in the Indian context, see Wolchok et al. 2010.
10Each potential voter’s name is read aloud during the identity verification process.
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on voting.
Relative to a benchmark homogeneous team of officials, whose preferences are more
likely to be aligned, a mixed team may increase the probability of detection and punishment
of team members that act with bias in their administrative duties, reducing the likelihood
of such behavior. Officers within a team are stationed in close proximity, typically sitting
adjacent to one another (see Appendix Figure A.1). Observability of actions across team
members is therefore high and officers can lodge complaints to the ECI directly, with
potentially severe career consequences for individuals found to have behaved improperly
in the conduct of their duties. In addition to strengthening the deterrence effect stemming
from the potential for future punishment (i.e. higher expected costs), the presence of an
officer of different religion/caste on an otherwise homogeneous team may also lower the
probability that attempts at influencing voting on election day are successful (i.e. lower
expected gains), further weakening the incentives of officers to engage in biased behavior.
The verification of voter identity prior to the casting of votes necessarily involves
discretionary decision making by election officials. The judgement calls involved in this
process may give officers the ability to successfully influence voting outomes with a lower
probability of punishment as compared to actions that can be identified as improper
with greater certainty.11 As such, this step may be particularly susceptible to biased officer
behavior, resulting in the disenfranchisement of qualified potential voters or enfranchisement
of unqualified individuals.
The scope for officer discretion in the identity verification process, however, is heavily
influenced by the identification documents that potential voters possess. The government-
issued voter identity card is the officially preferred and least controvertible form of identifi-
cation (Appendix Figure A.2 provides an example of the card). While eleven other sets of
documents are allowed on election day, their use may provide greater discretionary cover
to biased officer behavior during voter identity assessment. Potential voters may be less
11Guidelines from the ECI on election day management of polling stations even state that “minor errors in
the EPIC [voter identity card] and electoral roll may be ignored and overlooked.”
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certain about what constitutes a valid alternative means of verifying identity, making them
less likely to dispute officer judgement regarding their qualification to vote or increasing
their susceptibility to influence in choice of candidate (e.g. if they are reciprocal individuals
and feel as if they are receiving a favor in being allowed to vote). The potential monitoring
benefit provided by a shift from homogeneous to mixed officer team composition may then
be particularly important in situations where voter identity cards are less common.
The officer team is also responsible for maintaining a neutral environment in the area
immediately surrounding the polling station. More specifically, any activities which may
influence potential voters, such as canvassing of votes or disorderly behavior, are officially
prohibited within one hundred meters of the polling station. If all officers on a team are
of the same type, they may selectively allow agents of the political coalition with which
they are aligned to engage in such behavior within that range of the station. As mixed team
composition may weaken the incentives of officers to behave with bias, the likelihood that
agents from both coalitions are prevented from violating neutrality could increase. In sum,
if a homogeneous officer team behaves with bias and relatively favors one coalition, shifting
to a mixed team would be expected to decrease votes for the previously favored coalition
(here the BJP) and/or increase votes for the other coalition (here the RJD), with ambiguous
predictions on total turnout.
Second, in the absence of biased behavior on the part of officers, introducing hetero-
geneity into polling station teams may influence voting through a “team performance”
channel. The literature on teams and heterogeneity has highlighted the potential tradeoff
of benefits associated with a greater diversity of skills and information against increased
communication and coordination costs and reduced motivation (Prat 2002, Hamilton et al.
2003, Marx et al. 2015). Changes in the overall productivity of the officer team may affect
the length of waiting time and consequently the proportion of potential voters willing to
incur this cost of voting. In this case, impacts would be expected on total turnout, with
effects on the votes received by each coalition in the same direction.
Finally, the identities of the election officials with whom potential voters interact at the
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polling station may impact voting behavior through an “identity salience” channel. The
behavior of voters has been shown to be sensitive to small changes (Gerber and Rogers 2009,
Shue and Luttmer 2009, Bryan et al. 2011), and, even if officer actions are unaffected by
team composition, the religion and caste of the election officials present on election day may
be discerned by potential voters and influence their behavior. Effects of this type would be
expected primarily to influence the choice of candidate, rather than the extensive voting
margin.
1.3.2 Cross-station spillovers
In addition to impacting voting within a given polling station, the composition of an officer
team may affect other stations, especially in settings where stations can be located within a
short distance of one another (see Figure 1.3 and Appendix Figure A.3). Accounting for the
possibility of these cross-station effects is important when calculating the total impact of
changes in team composition, as their exclusion could bias the overall estimates downward
or upward.
If a polling station is more strictly managed in terms of maintaining a neutral envi-
ronment under mixed officer composition, the ability of local political agents to influence
proceedings there could be reduced. These individuals may then intensify their focus
on other stations which are more amenable to their activity, leading to “displacement
effects” (Ichino and Schündlen 2012) that reduce the magnitude of the total impact on
voting outcomes. The effects of more impartial management could alternatively spill over
positively to nearby stations. Informational spillovers about what constitutes sufficient
documentation for identity verification may take place across potential voters in neighboring
polling stations, or the presence of officers of different types on teams in close proximity
may serve a monitoring role as within teams. In these cases, mixed team composition could
yield additional “chilling effects” (Callen and Long 2015) that increase the magnitude of
the total effect. It is also possible that both displacement and chilling effects occur, but over
different distances from a given polling station. Chilling effects would be expected to occur
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Notes: Each circle represents a polling station, with the color signifying whether the officer team was homoge-
neous or mixed in composition. Figure presents an example area.
Figure 1.3: Variation in officer team composition across polling stations
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across polling stations in closer proximity, while displacement effects could take place over
longer distances.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Administrative data
Administrative data on polling officers was acquired for two districts in Bihar for the 2014
elections, covering 23,384 officials posted across 5,561 polling stations. The data include
officer name, team and position assignment, and, for a subset of officials, age and monthly
salary. This information allows for inference of the religious and caste composition of each
polling station team, described in greater detail in Section 4.3. Polling stations with at least
one Muslim or Yadav officer are defined as “mixed”, as opposed to “homogeneous”, team
polling stations.
Polling station level electoral returns were obtained from the website of the Office of
the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), Bihar. The main outcomes of interest generated from
this data are the log numbers of votes received by each of the two main coalitions and
cast in total, and the vote share margin between the coalitions. Sub-constituency-level
measures of voter identity card possession were also acquired from the CEO website. Due
to political sensitivity, religious composition statistics are not released by the government
below the sub-district level. In order to generate new measures of electorate religious and
caste composition at the polling station level, publicly available online lists were scraped
covering the approximately 5.6 million registered voters in the two districts for which officer
assignment data was available.
For the analysis of cross-station spillover effects, I use the polling station GPS coordinates
from the dataset of Susewind (2014). As polling station identifier numbers change across
elections and those in the dataset reflect the 2010 election cycle, stations were then hand
matched by name, achieving a 94.5 percent match rate. The non-matches come almost
entirely from new polling stations created due to increases in the number of registered
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voters. I also use 2011 census village shapefiles acquired from MLInfoMap to match polling
stations to villages.
1.4.2 Survey data
Between May and September 2015, surveys of potential voters and election officers from
the 2014 elections gathered information on socio-demographic characteristics and election-
related experiences. Experimental modules, discussed in more detail in Section 1.6, were
additionally included to generate measures of officer bias. The surveys were conducted in
one of the two districts for which officer assignment data was available.
For the survey of potential voters, a total of 4,320 individuals across 360 polling sta-
tions were sampled. In each of the 5 sub-constituencies in the district, 36 mixed and 36
homogeneous team polling stations were randomly selected, stratifying by whether the
Muslim-Yadav proportion of the population was above or below the district-level median.
For each of these polling stations, three Muslim and two Yadav registered voters were
randomly chosen from the list of registered voters, if possible, along with seven randomly
selected registered voters inferred as neither Muslim nor Yadav.
A total of 915 officers across 610 polling stations were sampled for the survey of election
officers. 61 mixed and 61 homogeneous team polling stations in each of the 5 ACs were
chosen randomly. One Muslim or Yadav officer and one non-Muslim, non-Yadav officer
were then randomly selected from each mixed team, while a single non-Muslim, non-Yadav
officer was randomly chosen from each homogeneous team.
Willingness to participate was high for both surveys: greater than 98 percent of contacted
individuals in each agreed to be surveyed. Consent is not significantly correlated with voter
or officer religion/caste, nor the overall composition of the team at the polling station to
which they were assigned. Appendix Section A.1 provides additional details on the survey
sampling methodology.
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1.4.3 Inference of religious and caste identity
The categorization of election officers and registered voters as Muslim, Yadav, or neither is
inferred from name. The Anthropological Survey of India’s People of India (POI) series lists
common surnames as well as religion and caste for 261 distinct communities identified as
inhabiting Bihar. As surnames may be associated with multiple communities, potentially
of different religious or caste affiliations, individuals are categorized as Muslim if their
surnames match one listed in the POI that is associated only with Muslim communities.
Individuals are also identified as Muslim if their name had components of clear Islamic
origin, e.g., “Raiyaz” or “Mohammed”. I categorize as Yadav those individuals with the
surname “Yadav”, as the majority of the members of the caste are so named and the surname
is not associated with other communities. The lists of registered voters also provide the
name of a relative for each individual (typically a father in the case of males or unmarried
females, and husband in the case of married females). Given strong norms of marrying
within religion and caste group in the region, I also categorize registered voters as Muslim
or Yadav if their listed relative was inferred as falling into one of these categories. To the
extent that individuals are misclassified, estimates of the impact of Muslim/Yadav officer
presence will be biased toward zero.
1.4.4 Identification and randomization check
In the two sample districts, between 8.3 and 9.3 percent of officers in each team position are
Muslim/Yadav, yielding 32.3 percent of polling stations with at least one Muslim/Yadav
officer (i.e. mixed team). As officers within a district are not assigned to sub-constituencies
in which they are registered to vote or work full time, a sub-constituency with a larger
population proportion of Muslim/Yadav officers relative to other constituencies within the
same district, for example, could then receive a lower proportion of Muslim/Yadav officers
assigned to its polling stations, potentially mechanically leading to correlations between
team composition and voting outcomes. However, it is still the case that each polling station
within a sub-constituency is equally likely to have Muslim/Yadav officials posted to the
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officer team. I therefore exploit only within-sub-constituency variation in team composition
by including sub-constituency-level fixed effects in my subsequent analysis. In addition,
because the likelihood of Muslim/Yadav presence on a team is increasing in the number
of officers, which is itself determined by the number of registered voters assigned to the
polling station, I include fixed effects for team size.
A remaining concern is the validity of the government’s implementation of the random
assignment. As a randomization check, I examine whether polling stations with mixed
composition teams differ significantly in pre-election dimensions potentially correlated with
voting outcomes, using the specification:
Ypc = mc + qo + bMixedpc + epc, (1.1)
where p is a polling station in sub-constituency c, mc are sub-constituency-level fixed effects,
and qo are fixed effects for the number of polling team members. Ypc is an outcome of
interest, and Mixedpc is an indicator variable taking value 1 if at least one polling team
member is Muslim/Yadav and 0 otherwise.
In Panel A of Table 1.1, I consider whether the size or composition of the electorate
differs across homogeneous and mixed team polling stations. The average polling station
has roughly 1,000 registered voters of which 46 percent are female and 13 percent are
Muslim or Yadav, with no significant differences by team composition. In Panel B, I examine
station-level electoral results from the previous 2010 elections to the state assembly. As
the number of polling stations increases over time due to growing numbers of registered
voters, it is not possible to fully match polling stations across elections. For each 2010
election-related variable, I therefore take the average value across all polling stations within
the same immediate location in 2010 and assign it to each polling station in that location
in 2014.12 Additionally, a small proportion of polling stations were established in new
locations for the 2014 election and so cannot be matched to previous elections.13 I observe
12Section 1.5.2 provides greater detail on the identification of locations.
13The total number of polling stations across Bihar increased by 5.9 percent between the 2010 and 2014
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no significant differences in the log votes previously received by either coalition or in total,
or in the vote share margin between the coalitions.14
I next test for balance in the samples of surveyed election officers and potential voters in
Panels C and D. Election officers are on average 43 years old, and the majority are college
educated (70%) and have prior polling station experience (66%).15 None of the officer
characteristics differ significantly with team composition.16 The sample of potential voters
is approximately 44 percent Muslim/Yadav (by construction), 40 percent literate, and 55
percent female. While respondents from homogeneous team polling stations are more
likely to be female (58 versus 54 percent), the other characterstics considered do not differ
significantly by team type, and I control directly for gender when applicable in the analysis
that follows.
Appendix Table A.1 tests for differences by team composition in the spatial distribution
of surrounding polling stations. Polling stations have an average of 1.2 immediate neighbors
(ranging between 0 and 8), 0.39 being mixed team (ranging between 0 and 4). Neither of
these characteristics differ significantly across team types, nor do the average numbers of
total or mixed team polling stations within 0.25 kilometers, between 0.25 and 0.75 kilometers,
or within the same or neighboring villages. Finally, Appendix Table A.2 shows that the
assignment of a Muslim/Yadav officer to a given position is not significantly correlated with
officer type in the other positions within that team.
elections.
14Observation numbers change across the previous election outcomes because the coalitions (as defined in
2014) fielded candidates in different numbers of constituencies in 2010.
15Election officers are officially required to be male, with the rare exception of certain heavily Muslim areas
where female officers may be used to interact with the female population. The sample area contains no stations
of this type.
16By definition, homogeneous officer teams do not contain Muslim/Yadav officers. Therefore balance tests
across team types of officer characteristics are necessarily restricted to the sample of non-Muslim/Yadav officers.
Potential differences in characteristics across officer types are considered in Section 1.7.
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Table 1.1: Randomization check
Homog. Mixed
team team Difference p-value Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Electorate characteristics
Ln total registered voters 6.873 6.905 0.009 0.160 5,561
[0.314] [0.305] (0.007)
Share female registered voters 0.463 0.463 0.000 0.864 5,561
[0.023] [0.022] (0.001)
Share Muslim/Yadav registered voters 0.128 0.135 0.005 0.312 5,561
[0.172] [0.175] (0.005)
Panel B. Prior election (2010) characteristics
Ln total votes 6.061 6.057 -0.007 0.412 5,275
[0.332] [0.319] (0.009)
Vote share margin RJD-BJP coalition -0.287 -0.272 0.000 0.992 3,947
[0.378] [0.376] (0.009)
Ln votes RJD coalition 3.941 3.945 -0.009 0.694 5,246
[1.424] [1.403] (0.023)
Ln votes BJP coalition 4.940 4.901 -0.003 0.899 3,946
[0.995] [1.019] (0.025)
Panel C. Officer characteristics
Age 42.313 43.264 0.910 0.294 517
[9.781] [9.677] (0.866)
College graduate 0.695 0.675 -0.014 0.728 516
[0.462] [0.469] (0.041)
Ln monthly salary 9.539 9.584 0.047 0.371 503
[0.609] [0.562] (0.053)
First time officer 0.342 0.325 -0.017 0.686 511
[0.475] [0.469] (0.042)
Panel D. Registered voter characteristics
Muslim/Yadav 0.430 0.446 0.016 0.306 3,903
[0.495] [0.497] (0.016)
Age 45.402 45.453 0.073 0.900 3,877
[16.844] [16.429] (0.577)
Female 0.580 0.537 -0.043 0.008 3,903
[0.494] [0.499] (0.016)
Literate 0.385 0.413 0.028 0.107 3,901
[0.487] [0.493] (0.018)
Household head 0.458 0.463 0.006 0.730 3,903
[0.498] [0.499] (0.018)
Ln monthly household income 8.212 8.254 0.038 0.286 3,326
[0.828] [0.827] (0.035)
Voter identity card possession 0.945 0.940 -0.004 0.647 3,903
[0.228] [0.237] (0.009)
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report variable means with standard deviations in brackets for homogeneous and
mixed officer teams. Column (3) reports the coefficient from an OLS regression where the listed outcome is
regressed on an indicator for polling station mixed team composition and column (4) reports the associated
p-value. Panels A and B also include sub-constituency and number of officer fixed effects. Prior election
characteristic outcome values are based on the average value across all polling stations from 2010 in the same
location as the 2014 polling station, as the total numbers and locations of polling stations change across election
cycles. 2014 coalition definitions are used. Panel C is restricted to non-Muslim/Yadav officer respondents, due
to the definition of mixed teams. Additionally included are sub-constituency fixed effects. Panel D considers
registered voter respondents and additionally includes strata fixed effects (sub-constituency and above-below
district-level Muslim/Yadav registered voter percentage median). *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5
percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Notes: The figure plots kernel density estimates of the polling station-level vote share margin between the
RJD and BJP coalitions, separately for polling stations with homogeneous (dashed line) and mixed (solid line)
teams of polling stations officers. Estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The p-value is computed using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test for the two groups of polling stations.
Figure 1.4: Empirical distribution of coalition vote share margins by team composition
1.5 Reduced-form impacts on voting outcomes
1.5.1 Within-station effects
Does the presence of Muslim/Yadav officers on polling station teams change voting out-
comes? Figure 1.4 plots the distribution of the polling-station-level vote share margin
between the RJD and BJP, separately by team type. The average vote share of the RJD
relative to that of the BJP is lower for homogeneous teams, where the equality of the
distributions can be rejected at the 5 percent level.
I further examine impacts on voting by estimating equation (1.1), including polling-
station-level controls for the log number of registered voters and the share categorized
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Table 1.2: Impacts of randomized officer team composition on voting outcomes
Vote share
Ln votes Ln votes margin Ln total
RJD BJP RJD-BJP votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Within-station effects
Mixed team 0.046* -0.041* 0.023** 0.001
(0.027) (0.021) (0.010) (0.008)
Muslim/Yadav registered voter % 0.031*** -0.030*** 0.015*** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Ln total registered voters 1.008*** 1.177*** -0.060*** 0.935***
(0.060) (0.048) (0.023) (0.018)
Observations 5,535 5,549 5,552 5,552
Homogeneous team mean [SD] 4.451 5.143 -0.181 6.180
[1.198] [0.969] [0.452] [0.402]
Panel B. Cross-station spillovers
Mixed team 0.045* -0.040* 0.023** 0.000
(0.027) (0.021) (0.010) (0.008)
Number mixed team neighbor stations 0.031 -0.042** 0.026*** 0.003
(0.025) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008)
Total neighbor stations -0.044*** 0.046*** -0.032*** -0.017***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 5,535 5,549 5,552 5,552
Number locations 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the polling station level of the listed variable on
an indicator for mixed team composition. Additionally included are sub-constituency and number of officer
fixed effects and controls for Muslim/Yadav share of registered voters and log total registered voters. Standard
errors clustered at the station level. In Panel B, variables for the numbers of total and mixed composition team
neighboring polling stations are also included. Neighbor stations are polling stations within the same location
(building/compound) as a given polling station. Standard errors in Panel B clustered at the location level.
*Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
as Muslim/Yadav to improve statistical precision.17 In Table 1.2, column (1) of Panel A
shows that changing from a homogeneous to mixed officer team significantly increases
the votes received by the RJD by 4.6 percent on average. I also observe a significant 4.1
percent decrease in BJP votes in column (2). In column (3), I consider the combined impact
on the vote share margin between the RJD and BJP and find that mixed team composition
significantly narrows the gap between the coalitions by 2.3 percentage points, or 12.7 percent.
Consistent with the strong connections of religion and caste to political affiliation in
17Results are robust to the exclusion of these covariates.
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this setting, I also observe that a 1 percentage point increase in the Muslim/Yadav share of
registered voters at a polling station is associated with a 3 percent increase in RJD votes and
3 percent decrease in BJP votes. Changing from a homogeneous to mixed team of officers
therefore has roughly the same impact as increasing the Muslim/Yadav share of registered
voters by 1.5 percentage points, where the overall average across sample polling stations
is 13 percent. Finally, while column (4) indicates that mixed team composition has no
average effect on the log total votes cast, I am unable to rule out effects of approximately 1.6
percentage points in magnitude in either direction,18 and, as described earlier, the expected
impact of changing composition on total votes is ambiguous.
1.5.2 Cross-station spillovers
I next test for spillover effects of team composition across polling stations in close proximity.
Stations are defined as neighbors if their locations match in the administrative data,19 or if
they are within 0.1km based on the available GPS coordinates. I exploit the fact that, for
each polling station, the officer assignment mechanism also generates random variation in
the proportion of neighboring stations with mixed officer teams. Similar to Miguel and
Kremer (2004) and Callen and Long (2015), I estimate spillovers with the specification:
Ypc = mc + qo + bMixedpc + gTpc + fNpc + X0pcl+ epc, (1.2)
where Npc is the number of neighbors of polling station p in constituency c, and Tpc is
the number of these neighbors with a mixed officer team. Standard errors are clustered
at the location level. Impacts associated with polling station density are captured by Npc.
Conditional on this density, the number of neighbors with mixed composition teams is
18Appendix Table A.3 considers whether impacts vary significantly by: the position within a team in
which Muslim/Yadav officer presence occurs, or the presence of single versus multiple Muslim/Yadav officers.
Significant differences are not found across positions or by number. Appendix Table A.4 additionally shows the
absence of significant heterogeneity in impacts by share Muslim/Yadav registered voters.
19For example, a group of polling stations may be listed in the administrative data as situated in “K L
Primary School (South Part)”, “K L Primary School (North Part)”, and “K L Primary School (Middle Part)” and
would be categorized as neighbors.
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randomly determined.
The within-station direct effects of mixed team composition on voting outcomes are
given by b, while g is the average cross-station spillover effect of a mixed team neighbor.
Note also that, since the team type at each polling station with a given number of neighbors
is orthogonal to the number of those neighbors that are mixed team, the estimates of the
within-station impacts of changes in team composition should be unchanged from equation
(1.1).
To extend the consideration of spillovers to longer distances, I use two different ap-
proaches. First, I supplement equation (1.2) with the variables N0.25kmpc and N0.25 0.75kmpc ,
the number of non-neighbor polling stations within 0.25km and between 0.25-0.75km of
polling station p, and T0.25kmpc and T0.25 0.75kmpc , the numbers of such polling stations with
mixed composition teams.20 Second, while this specification allows the impact of team
composition on other stations to vary with linear distance, it may also be that a more
meaningful distinction is captured by administrative boundaries. I therefore employ a
specification which augments equation (1.2) with variables for the total and mixed team
numbers of non-neighbor polling stations within the same village as polling station p, Nvillpc
and Tvillpc , and neighboring villages, Nneipc and Tneipc .21
The estimates of equation (1.2) in Panel B of Table 1.2 identify the occurrence of chilling
effects across polling stations in close proximity. Columns (1) and (2) show an imprecisely
estimated 3.1 percent increase in RJD votes and a significant 4.2 percent decrease in BJP votes
associated with a change in a neighboring polling station from homogeneous to mixed team
composition. In column (3), the combination of these two effects yields a highly significant
2.6 percentage point cross-polling-station shift in vote share toward the RJD away from the
BJP. As expected given the randomization, the point estimates on the within-polling station
20The sample for this specification is slightly reduced, as it excludes polling stations which could not be
matched to the 2010 polling station GPS coordinates.
21As the top 1 percent of the distribution of villages in terms of polling stations has a mean of 98.8 as
compared to the overall mean of 2.4, I trim the sample for this specification to exclude polling stations located
in or neighboring these villages, which are also urban and large in area relative to typical villages.
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mixed team indicator are unchanged as compared to those from equation (1.1).
The results of tests for spillover effects over greater distances, defined in linear distance
and village boundaries, are shown in Panels A and B of Appendix Table A.5. While both
the within-station and cross-neighbor effects of team composition remain significant, the
estimates show no evidence of chilling or displacement effects over longer ranges.
1.6 Channel of impact: officer bias in discretionary decisions
Immediately prior to casting a vote at the polling station, each citizen must confirm her
identity as matching an individual on the list of registered voters at that station. The
verification process necessarily involves discretionary decisions by election officers, and so
is potentially susceptible to the influence of officer bias. In this section, I provide evidence
indicating that the process of voter identity verification is a major channel through which
team composition and officer bias interact to impact voting outcomes.
1.6.1 Vignette experiment: own-group bias in election officers
First, I test for election officer own-type bias in the evaluation of voting eligibility, using a
vignette experiment embedded within the survey of officers. I examine whether, holding all
other information constant, potential voters are more likely to be assessed by an election
officer as qualified to vote if they are of the same type as that official. Vignette experiments
have been used previously to address research questions in the electoral setting (Carlson 2010,
Banerjee et al. 2014) and are methodologically similar to the randomized CV experiment
approach that has been employed in the labor market discrimination literature (Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2003, Banerjee et al. 2009).
Each respondent was read a vignette describing a hypothetical individual attempting to
vote, with the wording identical across respondents with the exception of the individual’s
name, which was randomly assigned.22 Respondents were then asked to indicate the
22The vignette question was worded as: “Please consider the following situation: A voter named [RAN-
DOMLY ASSIGNED] arrives at the polling station without an EPIC card but has a government voter’s slip
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likelihood on a 4-point scale that the individual in the vignette would be able to cast a
vote. Each officer respondent was randomly assigned one of nine possible voter names.
Three names each were chosen to signal Muslim, Yadav, or Brahmin (the highest of Hindu
castes) identity in the hypothetical voter.23 To examine whether an officer’s evaluation of the
likelihood of a potential voter’s ability to cast a vote is influenced by whether that individual
is of the same type as the officer, I use regression specifications of the form:
Yqpc = mc + jn + pv + qMatchqpc + X0qpcl+ eqpc, (1.3)
where Yqpc is an outcome of officer q in polling station p in sub-constituency c, and mc
signifies sub-constituency fixed effects. Additionally included are fixed effects for the
randomly assigned potential voter name, jn, and election officer type, pv. Matchqpc is an
indicator variable taking value 1 if the election officer’s group type and that of the potential
voter are the same (e.g. Yadav and Yadav) and 0 otherwise. The potential-voter-name and
officer-type fixed effects control for the average differences in assessed likelihood of the
potential voter’s ability to vote across the different hypothetical names and by officers of
different types, so the coefficient of interest, q, gives the average change in officer assessment
caused by the officer-voter type match. Further controls included are fixed effects for
polling team composition and a set of officer-level covariates: age, log monthly salary, an
indicator for first term of service at a polling station, and fixed effects for occupation type,
education level, and polling team position. A second specification additionally includes
polling-station-level controls for log total registered voters, share Muslim/Yadav registered
voters, and fixed effects for station location type and number of officer team members.
I consider as outcomes both an indicator variable taking value 1 if the officer indicates
the individual would be “Likely” or “Very Likely” allowed to vote and a continuous variable
taking the 1-to-4 scale value. Figure 1.5 shows that for both variables the average assessed
without a photograph. He can recite his name and other particulars. On a scale of 1 to 4, how likely do you
think it is that he would be allowed to cast a vote based on this information?", where the potential responses are
“Very unlikely (1)”, “Unlikely (2)”, “Likely (3)”, “Very likely (4)”.
23Appendix Section A.2 provides the names used in each category.
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Table 1.3: Vignette experiment: own-type bias in officer assessment of voters
Ability to cast vote
0-1 indicator 4-point scale
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Officer-potential voter name type match 0.103* 0.111** 0.237** 0.258**
(0.056) (0.055) (0.117) (0.116)
Observations 871 869 871 869
Name fixed effects X X X X
Officer type fixed effects X X X X
Individual controls X X X X
Polling station controls X X
Non-match group outcome mean [SD] 0.382 0.380 2.096 2.092
[0.486] [0.486] [0.974] [0.974]
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates from regressions at the officer level of an indicator variable
taking value 1 if the respondent answers "Very likely (4)" or "Likely (3)" as opposed to "Unlikely (2)" or "Very
unlikely (1)" to the question: "A voter named [RANDOMLY ASSIGNED] arrives at the polling station without
an EPIC card but has a government voter’s slip without a photograph. He can recite his name and other
particulars. On a scale of 1 to 4, how likely do you think it is that he would be allowed to cast a vote based on
this information?" and 0 otherwise, on an indicator variable for whether the officer’s own type matches that
(Muslim, Yadav, Brahmin) of the randomly assigned voter name. Columns (3) and (4) report OLS estimates from
regressions with the 1-4 scale value as the outcome. Columns (1) and (3) include fixed effects for respondent
name and officer type, the stratification variables (sub-constituency in which officer was assigned to a polling
station and officer category [Muslim/Yadav at mixed polling station, non-Muslim/Yadav at mixed polling
station, non-Muslim/Yadav at homogeneous polling station] plus the following individual level controls: age,
log monthly salary, an indicator for first term of service at a polling station, and fixed effects for occupation
type, education level, and polling station position. Columns (2) and (4) further include polling station level
controls for log total registered voters and proportion Muslim/Yadav registered voters, and fixed effects for
station location type and number of team officers. Standard errors are clustered at the polling station level.
*Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
likelihood of voting increases significantly when the hypothetical individual is of the same
type as the election officer. Table 1.3 presents the underlying estimates from equation
(1.3). Considering the binary outcome variable, columns (1) and (2) show a significant 10
percentage point, or more than 25 percent, increase in the probability that an individual
is assessed as likely able to cast a vote. Similarly, using the 4-point-scale measure as the
outcome in columns (3) and (4), a significant increase of approximately 0.24 points is
observed.
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Notes: The figure in the left panel depicts the estimated probabilities of an officer respondent indicating that a
hypothetical individual described in the officer’s survey vignette would be “(3) Likely” or “(4) Very Likely” able
to cast a vote, as opposed to “(2) Unlikely” or “(1) Very Unlikely”. The estimates are based on the regression in
column (2) of Table 1.3, assuming mean values of all control variables. The left bar represents the randomly
assigned subset of officer respondents for whom the hypothetical individual’s type (Muslim, Yadav, Brahmin)
did not match the officer’s own type, while the right bar represents the subset for whom the types match. The
figure in the right panel depicts the estimated 4-point scale values of a hypothetical individual’s voting ability
likelihood, based on the same question as the left panel. The estimates are based on the regression in column
(4) of Table 1.3, assuming mean values of all control variables. The notes to Table 1.3 provide the full vignette
question text. Error bars signify 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 1.5: Own-type bias in officer assessment of voters
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1.6.2 List experiment: biased officer behavior on election day
I next consider whether biased officer behavior was perceived as a relevant election day
phenomenon by voters and election officers in this setting. As direct elicitation of survey
respondents may yield unreliable estimates of the occurrence of potentially sensitive topics
such as biased officer behavior during elections, I employed list experiments in both the
surveys of registered voters and election officials. This method of indirect elicitation has
been used to generate measures of sensitive topics related to political and electoral behavior
in a number of recent papers (Gonzalo-Ocantos 2010, Corstange 2012, Kramon and Weghorst
2012, Ahlquist et al. 2013, Burzstyn et al. 2014).
For each list experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to either a control or
treatment group. Members of each group were asked to indicate only the total number
of statements that occurred at their polling station during the 2014 elections from a list
of statements read to them. Control respondents were given a list of four statements on
non-sensitive election day topics, while treatment respondents were read the same list
but with an additional sensitive statement included. This approach prevents individual-
level determination of which statements were chosen, but allows for the population-level
prevalence of the sensitive statement’s occurrence to be estimated as follows:
Nipc = ac + fTreatipc + X0ipcl+ eipc, (1.4)
where Nipc is the number of statements indicated as occurring at polling station p by
respondent i, Treatipc is an indicator variable for assignment to the group additionally
receiving the sensitive statement, and Xipc is a vector of polling station and individual
characteristics. Assuming that respondents assess the sensitive item truthfully and the
inclusion of the sensitive topic does not influence their evaluation of the non-sensitive items,
f gives an unbiased estimate of the population proportion for whom the sensitive item
occurred. Standard errors are clustered at the polling station level. Additionally included
are polling-station-level controls for log registered voters, share Muslim/Yadav registered
voters and fixed effects for polling station number of officers and location type and for the
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respective survey sampling strata. For officer-respondent regressions, individual controls
for age, log monthly salary and fixed effects for occupation type, education level, first term
of service, and team position are included. For voter-respondent regressions, controls for
age, gender, log monthly household income, and household head status and fixed effects
for occupation category and education level are included.
The survey of election officers included two list experiments.24 The sensitive statements
for the treatment group in the first and second experiments were: “One or more of the
election officers at the polling station treated some voters differently based on the voters’
religion or caste” and “One or more of the election officers tried to influence some voters’
choice of candidate or make it harder for them to vote”. Similarly, the two list experiments
included in the survey of registered voters had the sensitive statements: “One or more of
the election officers at your polling station treated you or others differently based on your
religion or caste” and “One or more of the election officers at your polling station tried
to influence how you or others voted or to make it more difficult for you or them to cast
votes”.
Table 1.4 presents the results of the list experiments. The estimates in column (3) of
Panel A indicate that 19 percent of officers agree that at least one of the officers at their
polling station treated voters differently based on religion or caste and 5 percent that at one
least member of their polling station team tried to influence voter behavior, whether choice
of candidate or making it more difficult to vote. I turn to the registered voter results in
Panel B. Estimates imply that 25 percent of respondents indicate that election officials at
their polling station treated voters differently based on religion or caste and 13 percent that
election officers tried to influence voting behavior at their polling station.
The wording of these statements is admittedly somewhat broad, and respondents
may vary in how they interpret them. Therefore, the aim of these experiments is not
to provide precise estimates, but rather to demonstrate the occurrence of biased officer
behavior connected to religion/caste on election day. The results, from both populations of
24Appendix Section A.2 provides the introductory prompt used in these experiments.
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Table 1.4: List experiments: biased officer behavior on election day
Control Treatment Difference Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Election officers
"One or more of the election officers at 1.915 2.086 0.192*** 878
the polling station treated some voters [0.777] [0.873] (0.048)
differently based on the voters’ religion
or caste.”
"One or more of the election officers 2.883 2.960 0.047** 877
tried to influence some voters’ choice [0.376] [0.398] (0.021)
of candidate or make it harder for them
to vote."
Panel B. Registered voters
"One or more of the election officers at 2.036 2.280 0.254*** 3,532
your polling station treated you or [0.758] [0.913] (0.026)
others differently based on your religion
or caste."
"One or more of the election officers at 2.396 2.539 0.128*** 3,547
your polling station tried to influence [0.682] [0.809] (0.023)
how you or others voted or to make it
more difficult for you or them to cast votes."
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report unconditional means and standard deviations of the control (individuals
receiving a list of four questions with the listed statement omitted) and treatment (individuals receiving a
list of the same four questions plus the listed statement included). Column (3) reports the coefficient of an
OLS regression at the individual level of the total number of statements the respondent indicated occurred
at the polling station during the 2014 elections and sub-constituency fixed effects. Additionally included are
polling-station-level controls for log total registered voters, share Muslim/Yadav registered voters, and fixed
effects for location type and number of officers. In Panel A, additional officer-level controls are age and log
monthly salary and fixed effects for occupation and education and controls for log monthly salary and prior
election experience. In Panel B, additional registered-voter-level controls are fixed effects for education level
and occupation type and controls for age, sex, household head status, and log monthly household income.
Standard errors are clustered at the polling station level. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.
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respondents, suggest that officers do attempt to influence voting behavior on election day,
and that religion and caste influence their treatment of voters. In the sections which follow,
I conduct tests which allow for a further disentangling of mechanisms.
1.6.3 Election day experiences of potential voters
In this section I examine how the election day experiences of potential voters vary by officer
team composition, both in terms of overall station area management and the individual-
specific identity verification process. I use the following specification to test for impacts on
the frequency of canvassing or disorderly behavior at the polling station, as reported by
registered voter survey respondents:
Ywpc = mc + qo + bMixedpc + X0wpcl+ ewpc (1.5)
where Ywpc is an outcome for respondent w in polling station p in sub-constituency c. The
included individual and polling station controls are the same as in equation (1.4). In an
additional specification, I examine whether the reported impact of team composition differs
with respondent type by interacting the officer team composition variable with an indicator
for whether the respondent is Muslim or Yadav. Standard errors are clustered at the polling
station level.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.5 show that the likelihoods of canvassing and disorderly
behavior are unaffected by team composition. Columns (2) and (4) further demonstrate that
the absence of significant differences holds regardless of respondent type. These results
suggest that stricter management of the area surrounding the polling station is not the
primary channel through which a shift from homogeneous to mixed team composition
impacts voting outcomes.
Turning to individual-specific experiences at the polling station, I employ the following
regression:
Ywpc = apc + fMYwpc + lIDwpc + y
 
MYwpc  IDwpc

+ X0wpcl+ ewpc (1.6)
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Table 1.5: Overall polling station management
Disorderly
Canvassing behavior
at station at station
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed team 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
Muslim/Yadav -0.003 0.010
(0.006) (0.014)
Muslim/Yadav * Mixed team 0.006 -0.018
(0.010) (0.019)
Observations 3,733 3,733 3,775 3,775
Polling stations 351 351 351 351
Outcome mean [SD] 0.020 0.020 0.068 0.068
[0.141] [0.141] [0.256] [0.256]
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the individual level of the listed variable on
an indicator for mixed officer team composition at the polling station. Even-numbered columns include an
interaction with an indicator for whether the respondent is Muslim/Yadav. Additionally included in all columns
are fixed effects for the stratification variables (sub-constituency and above-below district level median in terms
of MY elector percentage) and individual-level controls for age, sex, education level, household head status,
household structure type, occupation type, and log monthly household income. Polling-station-level controls are
included for log total registered voters, share Muslim/Yadav registered voters, and fixed effects for the number
of officers stationed at the polling station. Standard errors clustered at the polling station level. *Significant at
10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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where apc are polling station fixed effects and IDwpc is an indicator for voter identity card
possession by individual w at polling station p. I estimate this regression separately for
individuals in the randomly determined samples of mixed team and homogeneous team
polling stations. The same set of registered-voter-level controls from equation (1.4) are
included and standard errors are clustered at the polling station level.
I first consider a potential voter’s ability to cast a vote as an outcome. I find in column
(1) of Table 1.6 that, at polling stations with homogeneous officer teams, individuals
are significantly less likely to be able to vote if they are Muslim/Yadav. This difference
disappears among individuals with voter identity cards, which reduce the scope for officer
discretion. In addition, for non-Muslim-Yadav individuals, possession of a voter identity
card does not significantly change the likelihood of being able to cast a vote. Column (2)
shows that, at polling stations with mixed officer teams, voter identity card possession
significantly increases the likelihood of being allowed to cast a vote, but that this no longer
varies with Muslim/Yadav identity. These regressions include a variety of individual-level
controls, reducing concerns that the effects are driven by correlations between Muslim/Yadav
identity or voter identity card posession with unobservables that influence voting ability. To
summarize, at homogeneous team stations, voter identity cards matter in terms of voting
ability only for Muslim/Yadav potential voters, while at mixed team stations they are
important for potential voters of all types.
I subsequently examine as an outcome the likelihood of a potential voter having a
satisfactory overall experience at the polling station on election day.25 Column (3) shows
that Muslim/Yadav potential voters facing homogeneous teams of officers rate their polling
station experiences as worse on average, but only in the absence of voter identity cards. Non-
Muslim/Yadav voters, however, express lower satisfaction if they possess a voter identity
card. The latter effect could reflect that under-qualified non-Muslim/Yadav potential voters
are relatively more appreciative of being allowed to vote than those with voter identity
25This variable takes value 1 if a respondent indicates that her overall voting experience at the polling station
on election day was “Excellent”,”Good”, or ”Fair”, as opposed to “Poor”.
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Table 1.6: Identity verification experience of potential voters
Satisfactory overall
Able to cast vote station experience
Homog. Mixed Homog. Mixed
team team team team
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim/Yadav -0.104* -0.047 -0.066+ 0.001
(0.062) (0.066) (0.041) (0.031)
Possess voter identity card 0.011 0.105** -0.019* 0.013
(0.025) (0.046) (0.010) (0.024)
Muslim/Yadav * Possess voter identity card 0.109* 0.033 0.072* -0.004
(0.062) (0.066) (0.043) (0.033)
Observations 1,929 1,946 1,907 1,900
Polling stations 175 176 175 176
Outcome mean [SD] 0.981 0.980 0.981 0.982
[0.137] [0.138] [0.136] [0.133]
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the individual level of the listed variable on an
interaction of the Muslim-Yadav respondent indicator with an indicator for voter identity card possession,
for the sample of polling stations indicated in each column. Additionally included are polling station-level
fixed effects and individual-level controls for age, gender, education level, household head status, household
structure type, occupation type, and log monthly household income. “Satisfactory overall station experience” is
an indicator for whether the respondent indicated that their overall voting experience at the polling station on
election day was “Excellent”/”Good”/”Fair”, as opposed to “Poor”. Standard errors clustered at the polling
station level. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent. + p-value = 0.112.
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cards, who are more certain that they should be allowed to do so. I find in column (4) that
these impacts are absent at mixed team polling stations. Overall, the results in Table 1.6 are
consistent with mixed team composition and voter identity card provision each reducing
the differential treatment of potential voters at polling stations, where homogeneous teams
are relatively more stringent toward Muslim/Yadavs.
1.6.4 Heterogeneity in effects by voter identity card coverage
Using experimental and survey data, the previous sections established that election officers
are relatively biased in favor of potential voters of their own type and that individuals’
religious and caste identities can influence their ability to vote if they do not have a
voter identity card. If in general identity card possession reduces the scope of potentially
discriminatory discretion available to officers and mixed team composition shifts station
administration of the voter identification process to be more neutral, a substitute relationship
in the impacts of the two on polling-station-level voting outcomes would also be expected.
Returning to the polling station administrative data on voting outcomes, I test for this
substitutability using specifications of the form:
Ypc = mc + qo + bMixedpc + h(Mixedpc  IDc) + X0pcl+ epc, (1.7)
where IDc is the proportion of registered voters in sub-constituency c without a voter identity
card.26 Polling-station-level controls included are the log number of registered voters and
the Muslim/Yadav share of registered voters. The top one percent of observations in terms
of the absolute value of the vote share margin between the RJD and BJP are trimmed.27
The main effect for IDc is absorbed by the sub-constituency-level fixed effects, and the
coefficient of interest is h, where an estimated sign opposite that of b indicates that polling
station composition and voter identity card coverage exhibit substitutability in their impacts
on voting outcomes. Sub-constituency-level voter identity card coverage is not randomly
26The lowest level at which data on voter identity card coverage is available from the government.
27These are polling stations where one coalition won by a margin of at least 88 percent.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneity in effects of team composition by voter identity card coverage
Vote share
Ln votes RJD Ln votes BJP margin RJD-BJP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mixed team * -0.009* -0.014* 0.005 0.010* -0.004** -0.006**
Voter identity card coverage % (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
Mixed team 0.809 1.072 -0.453 -0.960* 0.383** 0.558*
(0.457) (0.768) (0.332) (0.579) (0.173) (0.314)
Observations 5,429 5,429 5,439 5,439 5,442 5,442
Polling station controls X X X X X X
Sub-constituency fixed effects X X X X X X
Interacted sub-constituency controls X X X
Implied effect: minimum sample 0.129** 0.152*** -0.079** -0.086** 0.063*** 0.072***
card coverage sub-constituency (0.054) (0.057) (0.040) (0.043) (0.022) (0.024)
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the polling station level of the listed variable on an
indicator for mixed team composition interacted with the sub-constituency-level percentage of registered voters
with a voter ID card. Also included are sub-constituency and number of officer fixed effects and controls for
Muslim/Yadav share of registered voters and log total registered voters. Even-numbered columns additionally
include interactions (not shown) with sub-constituency-level measures of the population proportions that are
literate and Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe, and the share of registered voters that are Muslim/Yadav (none
of these interaction effects are statistically significant). The implied effect given in each column reflects the
estimated impact of mixed team composition for the sub-constituency with the lowest level of voter identity card
coverage observed in the sample. Coverage ranges between 76.3 and 93.9 percent in sample sub-constituencies.
The sample trims the top one percent of observations in terms of absolute value of coalition vote share margin
(polling stations with a margin greater than 88 percentage points). *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5
percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
determined, and may be correlated with other characteristics that mediate the impact of team
composition on voting outcomes. As a robustness check I therefore consider a specification
where I additionally interact officer team composition with sub-constituency-level measures
of the population proportions that are literate, Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, and
Muslim/Yadav.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.7, I find that the positive impact of mixed team
composition on RJD votes decreases by a significant 0.9 percentage points per 1 percentage
point increase in voter identity card possession. The results for BJP votes in columns (3)
and (4) also indicate that the team composition effects are strongest in areas with low voter
identity coverage. Columns (5) and (6) show that the vote share margin shift toward the RJD
caused by changing from a homogeneous to a mixed team is approximately 0.5 percentage
points smaller per 1 percentage point increase in voter identity card coverage.
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Notes: Figure plots the estimated polling-station-level impact of mixed team composition on the vote share
margin between the RJD and BJP coalitions at different levels of sub-constituency-level voter identity card
coverage. Dashed lines signify 95 percent confidence intervals. Calculated using the estimates from Column (5)
of Table 1.7.
Figure 1.6: Heterogeneity by voter identity card coverage in impact of team composition
Voter identity card coverage in my sample of sub-constituencies ranges from 76.3 to
93.9 percent. Figure 1.6 plots the implied effect of mixed team composition over a similar
range of voter identity coverage and demonstrates that the significant impact observed at
low coverage levels becomes insignificant as full coverage is approached. These estimates,
taken together with the earlier experimental and survey results, provide strong evidence
that mixed team composition and identity card coverage serve substitute roles in preventing
officer bias from undermining the neutrality of the identity verification process for potential
voters.
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1.7 Alternative explanations
A possible concern in attributing the previously identified impacts to bias associated with
officers’ religious and caste identities is that there may exist other characteristics that
correlate with these identities and also influence voting outcomes. This is unlikely to explain
the above results for two reasons: the previous analysis captures the effects of the presence
on otherwise homogeneous teams of officers that are either Muslim or Yadav, two groups
which are not particularly similar outside of their political alliance; and indviduals of
different religions and castes serving as polling station officers are more likely to be similar
along other dimensions than would be their populations in general.
First, Yadavs are a lower-caste Hindu group in Bihar and, other than in political orien-
tation, it is unclear along what dimensions they would be systematically more similar to
Muslims than to other Hindu groups, especially given the dispersed support for the BJP
across upper- and lower-castes in these elections.28 In Appendix Table A.6, I examine the
influence of Muslim and Yadav officer presence separately using a regression specification
analogous to that of equation (1.1). The estimates across columns (1) through (4) reveal
similar impacts for Muslim and Yadav officers. The coefficients for the two groups are
statistically indistinguishable in each case, and the shift in vote share margin toward the RJD
is significant at the 5 percent level for both Muslim and Yadav presence on officer teams.
Second, polling station officers are selected from pools of government employees who
are likely more similar than would be average individuals from different religious and
caste groups. I explicitly test for differences by Muslim/Yadav status in the sample of
surveyed polling station officers across a number of characteristics proxying for experience
and knowledge: age, log monthly salary, college graduation, and prior election officer
experience. I regress each of these outcomes on an indicator variable for Muslim/Yadav
identity and fixed effects for sub-constituency and team position. As a further check, I also
28Highlighting the differences between the two groups, Lalu Prasad Yadav, the politician responsible for the
creation of the Muslim/Yadav coalition, has even said “I have made an alliance between those who worship the
cow [Yadavs] and those who eat the cow [Muslims].” (Wittsoe 2013, p.60)
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Table 1.8: Variation in other officer characteristics by Muslim/Yadav identity
Survey data Administrative data
Ln First Ln
monthly College time monthly
Age salary graduate officer Age salary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Muslim/Yadav officer -0.340 0.018 -0.025 -0.019 0.439 0.001
(0.554) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.373) (0.012)
Observations 912 888 911 903 5,983 6,198
Non-Muslim/Yadav 42.822 9.563 0.684 0.333 44.975 9.291
outcome mean [SD] [9.727] [0.584] [0.465] [0.472] [9.802] [0.363]
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the officer level of the listed variable on an
indicator for Muslim/Yadav identity. Additionally included are sub-constituency and officer-position fixed
effects. Columns (1) through (4) are based on reported data from the survey of officers. Columns (5) and (6) are
based on full sample of administrative data available for the same district in which the surveys were conducted.
*Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
construct measures of age and log monthly salary based on separate administrative data
available for the full population of election officers in the district in which the officer survey
was conducted. The results in columns (1) through (6) of Table 1.8 show that in no case are
there significant differences by Muslim/Yadav status.
1.8 Conclusion
Having identified significant impacts of officer team composition on voting outcomes
within and across polling stations, a natural question is whether changes in composition
influence who ultimately wins elections. To examine this possibility, I conduct counterfactual
calculations of the effects of alternative officer assignment mechanisms on the identities of
winners in the 2014 parliamentary elections in Bihar.
I first use administrative data available across the state of Bihar to calculate the sub-
constituency-level average numbers of neighbor polling stations. Second, the observed
margins of victory from these elections already reflect the effects of the underlying (but
unobserved outside of the two study districts) proportions of mixed team polling stations
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in each parliamentary constituency. Finally, I assume that the proportion of mixed team
polling stations in each sub-constituency is the same as the average value (0.324) across
the two districts for which it can be directly observed in my data. I can then calculate
the magnitudes of the shifts in the proportions of homogeneous and mixed team polling
stations required to change the outcome of each election in which the RJD and BJP coalitions
were both either winner or runner up.29
I use these magnitudes to consider the effects of two alternatives to the current method of
randomized officer assignment: (1) requiring mixed team composition in all polling officer
teams, and (2) excluding Muslim/Yadav officers from teams. During the 2014 elections, the
RJD and BJP fielded the top two candidates in 29 of the 40 parliamentary constituencies
in Bihar (Appendix Figure A.4 provides the distribution of vote share margins). As shown
in Table 1.9, a shift to Alternative 1 is estimated to switch one election outcome in favor
of the RJD and a shift to Alternative 2 to change one outcome to a BJP victory. I repeat
this exercise for the most recent prior state assembly elections in 2010, where the RJD and
BJP fielded the top two candidates in 185 of 243 races. Reflecting the lower levels of voter
identity card coverage and greater number of close contests, thirty-three races are estimated
to change to an RJD victory under Alternative 1 and six elections to switch in favor of the
BJP under Alternative 2, or a combined 16 percent of the total.
In addition, the religious composition of candidates put forward in elections differs
considerably across the coalitions; 17.5 percent of RJD coalition candidates in the 2014 Bihar
elections were Muslim, as compared to just 2.5 percent for the BJP coalition. Accounting for
the religious identities of candidates, the previous counterfactual calculations also indicate
that a shift to all mixed team polling stations in Bihar would have led to a 25 percent
increase in Muslim legislators both in the 2010 assembly and 2014 parliamentary elections.
Recent work has shown that increasing Muslim representation in state legislatures in India
results in significant reductions in child mortality rates and gains in educational attainment
29Appendix Section A.3 additional details. The vote share margin between the runner-up candidate and the
remainder of the field is generally large enough that having a third place or lower candidate shift to become the
winner could not feasibly occur as a result of changes in team composition.
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Table 1.9: Changes in election outcomes under alternative officer assignment mechanisms
Alternative 1: Alternative 2:
All mixed teams No mixed teams
Vote Vote RJD/
BJP to share RJD to share BJP
RJD margin BJP margin top two Total
victory range victory range parties races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National parliament, 2014 1 -0.024 1 0.010 29 40
State assembly elections, 2010 33 [-0.066, 6 [0.004, 185 243
-0.0003] 0.023]
Notes: This table reports estimates of the potential number of races for which the winning candidate would have
switched between the RJD coalition and the BJP coalition, under two alternative officer assignment scenarios.
Alternative 1 is the presence of all mixed composition teams and Alternative 2 is the absence of any mixed
composition officer teams, assuming an initial 0.324 proportion of mixed teams (that observed in the available
2014 data). Columns (1) and (3) give the number of races for which the winning party would change as
indicated. Columns (2) and (4) give the range of the RJD-BJP coalition vote share margins observed in the
impacted constituencies. Column (5) gives the number of races in which the RJD and BJP coalitions fielded the
top two candidates, and column (6) the total number of races in Bihar for that election cycle. The calculation
accounts for spillover effects from neighboring mixed team polling stations and heterogeneity in impact by
voter identity card coverage (at the sub-constituency level).
across both Muslim and non-Muslim households (Bhalotra et al. 2014). This suggests that
the impacts on election outcomes associated with officer team composition may also have
important downstream effects on outcomes directly relevant to citizen well-being.30
Fair and well-functioning elections are critical to maintaining the responsiveness of
elected officials to citizens in democracies. While the related literature on election reforms
has focused in large part on the benefits of advances in monitoring and voting technology,
this paper is to my knowledge the first to provide rigorous evidence of the remaining impor-
tance of the identities of local-level election personnel. Indian elections are technologically
advanced and their administration is highly regulated, indicating that bias in discretionary
decision making of polling station officers can undermine the quality of service provision
30It is also possible that the effects of officer team composition on citizens’ election day experiences influence
their expectations and behavior in subsequent elections, for instance in whether to turn out at the polling station.
I use polling-station-level data for the 2015 state assembly elections in Bihar and find in Appendix Table A.7
that voting outcomes in these elections are unaffected by officer team composition from 2014, providing no
evidence of cross-election-cycle impacts on voter behavior.
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even at the present frontier of election practice.
Though my findings suggest that diversity within teams of election officers can im-
prove the impartiality of polling station management, it may not always be politically or
administratively feasible to mandate that such mixed composition occur. It could also be
difficult in other contexts to determine the relevant dimensions of identity along which
diversity should be defined. My results, however, additionally demonstrate that policies
which reduce the scope for officer discretion in the first place, such as the widespread
provision of voter identity cards, may be promising alternatives in reducing the ability of
local-level election officials to influence voting outcomes. More generally, the findings of this
paper demonstrate that institutions which require greater discretionary decision making by
bureaucrats or other government employees may be more susceptible to adverse impacts of
these individuals’ underlying biases on the quality of public services.
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Chapter 2
Can Electronic Procurement Improve
Infrastructure Provision? Evidence
from Public Works in India and
Indonesia1
2.1 Introduction
Contestable government procurement of goods and services has been estimated at over 7
percent of world GDP (OECD 2002), with the incidence rising in emerging economies: For
instance, in 2007, the Indian government spent over US $21 billion ($18 per capita) on the
procurement of external goods and services, over double what it spent in 2000 (IMF). Yet,
both the quantity and quality of recently constructed public infrastructure often remain
low (Briceño-Garmendia, Estache, and Shafik 2004). A limited supply of local qualified
contractors, collusion among contractors, and corruption among public officials have each
been cited as important reasons (Kenny 2007).
1Co-authored with Sean Lewis-Faupel, Benjamin A. Olken, and Rohini Pande
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A number of governments have responded by adopting electronic procurement (hence-
forth: e-procurement) (World Bank 2007). Broadly, e-procurement is the implementation
of a technological platform as directed by a potential buyer (a government agency or firm)
to facilitate transactions between that buyer and potential sellers of goods and services.
Commonly, the practice includes electronic postings by the buyer of products and services
desired for procurement. There is often an online method for potential suppliers to offer
those goods or services requested by the buyer, under a contract and price either preor-
dained by the buyer or offered by the potential seller. As with traditional procurement, there
is typically a method for choosing among contracts or prices offered by the potential sellers.
In some cases, this selection process is performed automatically by the technology.2 In other
cases, e-procurement consists of contracted sellers providing a set of goods or services at
fixed prices from which the buyer can choose as needed. Additionally, e-procurement may
allow for the electronic transfer of funds as agreed upon in the procurement contract. Finally,
the technology can facilitate a review by the buyer of the goods or services delivered by
the contracted seller, which may be communicated to the seller, considered when enforcing
contracts, and used by the buyer in future procurement decisions. We describe the specifics
of the e-procurement reforms in the Indian and Indonesian contexts in the next section.
E-procurement can potentially address three common concerns with manual procure-
ment practices: lack of access to bid information, collusion among bidders, and corruption.
By lowering the costs of obtaining information about a tender process, e-procurement may
increase the number of firms who can bid. Likewise, it can reduce bidder collusion by
providing tender information to firms outside a local cartel, allowing non-cartel firms to
participate and breaking up local bidding cartels. E-procurement can also mitigate cor-
ruption by reducing government officials’ ability to selectively withhold information or
refuse electronic bids from non-favored bidders. Moreover, by ensuring public access to
2The system may also allow potential sellers to electronically submit other supporting documentation, such
as resumes or technical capabilities, or allow the buyer and potential sellers to communicate electronically.
Additionally, e-procurement may be used to record and archive any number of other data points of interest to
the buyer.
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all procurement data, e-procurement enhances transparency and the possibility of public
oversight.
However, it is plausible that in low income settings, where information technology
coverage and other aspects of state capacity remain low, e-procurement can only effect
limited change and can potentially make things worse. Potential contractors (who are
currently not in the system) may continue never to learn about available tenders, and
cartels and corrupt officials may continue to use strong-arm tactics to prevent entry by such
contractors. If many small firms have limited access to the internet, requiring electronic bids
could harm competition.
In this paper we examine the impact of electronic procurement on public works projects
in two large emerging economies: India and Indonesia. In India, we examine procurement
practices between 2000 and 2009 for a federally funded rural road construction program
which is implemented by state road departments, the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sarak Yojana
(PMGSY) program. Under this program, roughly 145 road packages were tendered per
state per year. In Indonesia, we examine contract data from the national Ministry of Public
Works for both construction and consulting (e.g., engineering management and design)
contracts each year. On average, 32 consultancy and 58 construction packages per province
were issued each year. The gradual roll-out of e-procurement (at the state-level in India
and province-level in Indonesia) allows for a difference-in-differences strategy: We compare
outcomes in states/provinces before and after the adoption of e-procurement, as well as in
those continuing under manual procurement practices, allowing us to quantify the benefits
or costs of the practice in both countries.
For both countries, we obtained administrative data on the complete universe of contracts
from before and after e-procurement by scraping publicly available information from
respective government websites. In Indonesia we have bidding and final contract data for all
tenders; in India, the website publishes final contract data but not the details on individual
bids. All told, this leaves us with a dataset of over 20,000 contracts in India and over 14,000
tenders in Indonesia. In addition, in India, we hand collected bidding data on tenders for
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four states which we use to supplement the administrative data.
We first show that, in both India and Indonesia, e-procurement increases the probability
that the winning bidder comes from outside the region where the contract takes place.
This is consistent with e-procurement decreasing the costs of submitting bids for those
not physically present. We next examine the impact on the ultimate outcomes of interest:
price, quality of construction, and timeliness. We find no systematic evidence that electronic
procurement lowers prices paid by the government. In Indonesia, the point estimates
are consistent with small (2-5 percent) reductions in prices, but these are not statistically
significant. In India, final prices are unaffected. Overall, we can statistically rule out (at the
5 percent level) declines in contract values of more than 2.7 percent in India, of more than
6.6 percent for Indonesian consulting projects, and of more than 14.1 percent for Indonesian
works contracts.
In contrast, e-procurement led to quality improvements, albeit along different dimensions
in the two countries. A first measure of quality is time-overrun in project completion. Reports
of corruption of procurement in India typically focus on cases where works are abandoned
halfway through or completed in a very tardy manner. In our data we see that 77 percent
of road projects in India and around 95 percent of public works projects in Indonesia
are completed late. In India, we observe no statistically significant changes in late works,
while in Indonesia these declines are large and significant – whereas only 5 percent of
conventionally procured construction projects in Indonesia are completed on schedule, 20
percent of electronically procured construction projects are on time.
A separate indicator of quality, only available for India, is an independent audit report
on construction quality, which was conducted identically in roads completed under both
e-procurement and traditional procurement. According to this measure, we find that e-
procurement leads to higher quality roads, with the quality grades rising by about 12 percent
in e-procurement projects compared to other projects.
We then explore the degree to which the results are driven by improving outcomes
among already winning bidders, as opposed to changing who wins. To see whether the
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observed changes in outcomes reflect changes in selection of who wins, for the key variables
of interest – price, delays, and quality – we estimate a fixed effect for each contractor
and examine how e-procurement changes the average quality characteristics of winning
contractors (i.e., the fixed effects of who wins). We find that after e-procurement, winning
contractors in India tend to be those who have higher quality on average. In Indonesia,
we find evidence that those contractors who win after e-procurement are systematically
less likely to be late. This suggests that a key mechanism for e-procurement is allowing
higher quality contractors to enter and win projects, rather than simply encouraging better
performance from an existing set of contractors. Increased entry of contractors could reflect
better information flows and/or reduced ability of local contractors to prevent others from
filing tenders.
This paper is related to several economic literatures. While there is a growing body of
work which examines procurement (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti 2009, Krasnokutsaya and
Seim 2011), much of the literature has focused on the award procedures (i.e., scoring auctions
vs. lowest-price auctions, etc.) (Tran 2008) and potential interactions with other procurement
regulations (Decarolis 2014). This paper suggests that an important component, at least for
ensuring quality, can be in the implementation of the procurement auction, holding these
rules fixed. It also contributes to a growing literature using procurement data to examine
corruption (Di Tella and Shargrodsky 2003, Ferraz and Finan 2008, Bandeira, Prat, and
Villetti 2009, Bobonis, Fuertes, and Schwabe 2010, Cai, Henderson, and Zhang 2013).
Second, past work has highlighted the role of media and technology in shaping the
political and policy landscape. Strömberg (2004) suggests that media access among con-
stituents may make politicians more responsive to voters, while Falck, Gold, and Heblich
(2012), Jaber (2013) and Campante, Durante, and Sobbrio (2014) measure causal impacts of
internet access on political participation. Our paper complements this previous literature
by considering how new technology, in this case implemented by government itself, may
improve the outcomes of a government initiative.
Finally, this paper is part of a recent, broader agenda that documents the role of
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communication technology in development. While there are several studies that document
the impact of cell phone technology on market access (Jensen 2007, Aker 2010) and education
(Aker, Ksoll, and Lybbert 2012), this paper represents one of the first studies to examine the
impact of the internet on governance issues.
One advantage of our approach is that we use the same methodology to study separate
e-procurement programs in two different countries. To the extent that the findings from
both countries are similar, the external validity of our results is given credence. To the best
of our knowledge, this study represents one of the first microeconomic studies that uses
difference-in-differences to simultaneously evaluate a new program in multiple countries,
allowing for more careful conclusions with respect to external validity.3
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2 we describe the institutional details
relating to procurement practices and road construction in India and Indonesia. In Section
2.3 we describe the data and empirical strategy. In Section 2.4 we report the findings. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Background
We start by describing the public works programs in our two study countries, followed by
the nature of e-procurement adopted in these two settings. We conclude the section with a
brief description of likely channels of influence of e-procurement.
2.2.1 India
Public Works Program and Manual Procurement
In the year 2000, India launched a large-scale rural road construction scheme called Pradhan
Mantri Gram Sarak Yojana (PMGSY). The federal government provides funding for this
scheme and coordinates program implementation, but full executional responsibility lies
3The other study of this nature we are aware of is Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), which evaluates the
impact of state and provincial cigarette tax changes in the US and Canada.
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with state governments. Each state has a rural roads department which decides the schedule
for road construction and manages procurement. PMGSY roads follow a uniform criteria
for road construction in terms of material usage and quality for all Indian states.
For PMGSY, all states use the same procurement rules and standardized bidding docu-
ment, provided by the national roads agency. The procurement process follows a cost-based
auction procedure. Specifically, conditional on meeting a pre-specified set of technical
qualifications intended to ensure a contractor is capable of completing the project, the
contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. Importantly, these rules are identical for manual
and electronic procurement.
Anecdotally, public procurement in India is rife with corruption, and claims of impropri-
ety exist throughout the contracting process. Contractors have reported being physically
intimidated or barred from submitting bidding documents. The handling of bidding doc-
uments after submission has also been called into question with claims of altered bids,
inspection of bids prior to technical reviews, and intentional loss of submissions. There is
also concern that technical qualifications are used to unreasonably exclude certain firms
from the bidding process. The implication of many of these reports is that government
officials collect rents in exchange for some advantage in the bidding process.
As a case study, we examined the tendering process for manual procurement for a
random sample of 188 road contracts issued between 2001 and 2005 in the Indian state of
Uttar Pradesh. As Figure 2.1 shows, there is very little competition in PMGSY contracts. In
95 percent of cases, the price bid of only one firm was evaluated; that is, there was only one
bid submitted or all other bids were disqualified based on technical requirements. When we
observe multiple bids here, over three quarters of the time all but one bid are disqualified.
In the case of any technical disqualification, all but one bidder are disqualified 100 percent
of the time. Prima facie this pattern of disqualifications is consistent with corrupt officials
enforcing a desired winner.
In 2000, when the program began, all Indian states used a manual paper-based procure-
ment system to bid out contracts to private contractors. This process involved obtaining
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Number of
Number technical
of disqualifications
bidders 0 1 2 3 4
1 155
2 5 14
3 1 5
4 3 4
5 1
Total 164 14 5 4 1
Notes: Figure presents bidding data from a random sample of 188 road contracts issued between 2001 and
2005 in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (prior to e-procurement). Each cell is a count of tenders with the
respective number of bidders and technical disqualifications. Technical disqualifications are intended to prevent
a bidder who lacks the necessary expertise or equipment from competing. Blank cells indicate zeros. Note that
the diagonal comprises all cases of all-but-one disqualified.
Figure 2.1: Number of contracts by numbers of technical disqualifications and bidders
internal approval of the project, publishing a Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT) in several media
outlets (typically newspapers), having suppliers obtain detailed bid preparation materials
from the government, receiving bid submissions from suppliers, receiving bid evaluations
by buyers, and finally, the awarding of the procurement order and signing of agreements.
The complete process required a long chain of internal authorizations (at times involving
several departments), several visits by suppliers to departments, and the generation of reams
of paper-based statements and evaluations.
E-Procurement
The Indian IT Act of 2000 provided legal recognition to electronic transactions. Since
then, several Indian states have passed legislation enacting e-procurement, and the rural
roads department in several states followed by adopting e-procurement practices for road
construction. The implementation of e-procurement for PMGSY typically involves placing
all invitations for tender into an online, searchable database. An online portal is also
established that allows authorized users (contractors) to upload bidding materials. The
Indian e-procurement systems prohibit procurement officials from viewing contractor names
and viewing or editing price bids before completing the technical certification process, in
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Figure 2.2: E-procurement adoption - India
theory preventing favoritism in the selection process. Given the above description of how
most bidders are disqualified during the technical stage, this is potentially important for
preventing corrupt practices. Finally, much of the electronic data is stored after auctions are
completed, creating the potential for accountability.
We exploit this variation across time and states for our empirical analysis. Our sample
covers 27 Indian states and territories during the period January 2000 through August 2009.
During this time frame, 9 states adopted a system of electronic procurement. Figure 2.2
shows the dates when e-procurement rules were adopted in various states through August
2009. The first state to adopt, in 2004, was Andhra Pradesh, which (along with Karnataka)
is one of the technological leaders of India. (Note that in some states (Chattisgarh, Gujarat,
and Orissa), contracts which are below a state-specified cost threshold do not go through
the electronic procurement process and are processed on paper. Since the threshold may
respond endogenously to the auction policy (see, e.g., Tran 2008), during the applicable
periods, we classify all projects as electronically tendered in these states.)
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2.2.2 Indonesia
Public Works Program and Manual Procurement
In Indonesia, we examine the national Ministry of Public Works (MPW). The MPW procure-
ment process covers mainly two types of contracts, works and consulting. Works contracts
refer to projects such as the building or repairing of roads and bridges, where physical ser-
vices or construction work are conducted by the contract winner. Access to heavy equipment
and various construction materials is therefore typically a necessary component for these
projects. Consulting contracts, in contrast, entail the provision of professional expertise by
the winning bidder in planning or supervision services such as design and management.
Depending on the project, procurement takes place either at the national headquarters in
Jakarta or at the provincial offices of the MPW.
Works and consulting contracts additionally differ in the structure of their bidding
processes. Works contracts are generally assigned to the low bidder conditional on meeting
minimum administrative and technical qualifications, as in India. Consulting contracts
involve a pre-qualification phase in which potential bidders first submit a document con-
taining administrative, financial, and work experience information. A shortlist of firms
meeting minimum qualification requirements are then invited to submit technical and cost
bids. The winning bidder is assigned using a formula based on a combination of technical
score and price, rather than simply lowest bid conditional on meeting minimum technical
requirements as with works projects. For both types of contracts, a minimum of three bid
submissions are required; otherwise, the processes are repeated. The overall pool of bidding
firms consists of both private firms and state-owned construction firms, with state-owned
firms competing against the private sector without any special preferences.
Public procurement is widely considered “one of the most corruption-ridden sectors”
(Freedom House 2012) in Indonesia. For example, the 2009 Enterprise Survey of Indonesia
(World Bank and IFC) sampled 1,444 firms comprising a representative sample of the non-
agricultural formal private economy in the country. In the survey, 38.1 percent of respondents
who had attempted to secure a government contract in the previous year indicated that firms
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with characteristics similar to theirs make informal payments or give gifts to public officials
to secure such contracts, though the average value given for these bribes was only 1.8
percent of the total contract value. A separate survey of 792 randomly sampled construction,
consulting, and supplier firms conducted in 2010 by the Indonesia Procurement Watch
(Indonesia Procurement Watch 2011) provides further suggestive evidence of corruption in
the government procurement process, with 92.7 percent of respondents answering that they
thought their firm had ever given bribes to the government officials involved in managing
procurement. Additionally, 97.3 percent of respondents believed that it was not possible
to win the contract tender without bribery and more than 95 percent indicated that the
typical value of a bribe was more than 10 percent of the contract value. Beyond survey
results, of the 196 cases considered by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) of the
Government of Indonesia between 2004 and 2010, 86 dealt with bribery and graft related to
the procurement of goods and services and every such case resulted in a conviction (Onishi
2009, Parlina 2011).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the manual procurement process contributes to the
corruption problem in much the same ways as discussed in India. For example, government
officials may not make the detailed documents required to prepare a bid available to non-
favored firms or purposely misinform them about the proper submission process (UNAFEI
2008). Alternatively, there could be physical intimidation of firms that are not part of the
cartel from submitting bids.
E-Procurement
Indonesia began rolling out a “semi-electronic procurement” (SEP) system in 2004 in the
central ministry in Jakarta and expanded the procedure across the 33 provincial offices in
approximately concentric circles from Jakarta over the next 5 years, as shown in Figure 2.3.
The roll-out plan was devised from Jakarta and followed a standard pattern in Indonesia:
roll-out started in Java, spread to the most developed provinces in Sumatra and Sulawesi
next, and then was progressively rolled out throughout the country. Under SEP, firms are
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Figure 2.3: E-procurement adoption - Indonesia
able online to register expressions of interest, to download detailed bidding and technical
qualification documents, to submit pre-qualification materials, and to post questions and
complaints. However, due to a regulatory constraint, the final submission of bids was still
required to be conducted manually (hence the term “semi”) throughout the period we study.
The SEP process thus covers the entire procurement process except the final submission
of bids. There was no change in procurement rules associated with the switch to SEP;
procurement still followed the Presidential guidelines for the procurement of government
goods and services issued in 2003 (Government of Indonesia, 2003).4
Prior to the adoption of SEP in a province, procurement was in a “copy to internet”
(CTI) phase where the acquisition of bidding and technical qualification documents and the
submission of bids were carried out manually, but the contract details (bids of each firm
and the winner) were posted to the internet ex-post to be publicly available. Crucially for
our analysis, the data made public during the copy-to-internet and semi e-procurement
systems are identical and in fact use the same electronic platform; the only difference is
that procurement actually takes place electronically on the SEP system, whereas in copy-to-
4Full e-procurement was not introduced until after the period under study.
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internet, information is just released publicly ex-post. We discuss the data in more detail
below.
2.2.3 E-procurement: Channels of Influence
There are several mechanisms through with e-procurement could affect outcomes. First,
e-procurement could change the composition of bidders. By placing bidding documents
online and allowing interactions online rather than in person, e-procurement facilitates
bidding at a distance; on the other hand, since it requires internet access, it may be more
difficult for unsophisticated bidders. Second, e-procurement may increase the enforcement
of government rules and regulations. In the manual procurement system, the paper trail and
threat of audit ensures that rules are complied with, but this is imperfect; e-procurement
adds an additional layer of intermediation, where the computer system itself enforces
certain procedures. Third, e-procurement may prevent denial of access to non-favored
suppliers. For example, in a manual procurement system, a procurement official could, for a
supplier outside of a pre-specified cartel, claim that there were no copies available of bidding
documents or refuse to accept a bid. The e-procurement system cannot be manipulated
in this way and provides access to all equally. Finally, even if outcomes are not changed,
if e-procurement costs less for the government to administer than a manual procurement
process, it could still be beneficial to the government (Singer et al. 2009).
The impact of these changes on prices and quantities is ambiguous for several reasons.
First, while most of these effects of e-procurement are “positive” (in the sense of increasing
competition and/or reducing the possibility of corruption or collusion), there is one potential
downside, namely that it may make access more difficult for bidders with low internet
availability or low levels of computer skills.
Second, even conditional on “improving” outcomes for the government, it is not ex-ante
obvious whether this improvement will come in the form of lower prices, improved quality,
or both (Asker and Cantillon 2010). If e-procurement facilitates the entry of high quality
firms from farther away (say, high quality firms located in the capital city), one might expect
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quality to rise; prices might even rise as well. On the other hand, if e-procurement facilitates
the entry of more firms of similar quality, the impact could either be a fall in prices (if
existing firms bid the same quality as before but reduce prices in light of more competition)
or an increase in quality (if existing firms increase quality of their proposals for the same
price). Either way, these ambiguities suggest that it is important to measure the impacts on
both prices and quality when considering the net impact for the government.
These arguments hold true under a competitive model with no collusion or corruption,
but similar arguments can be made in cases of corruption, as well. For example, in a
corrupt world where the most efficient contractor can pay the highest bribe (as in Tran 2008
and Asker 2010), e-procurement, even if it eliminated the bribes, would not necessarily
change the identity of the firm winning the contract (Burguet and Che 2004). It would,
however, potentially reduce the price. On the other hand, if there was heterogeneity in
firms’ willingness to pay bribes, so the most efficient firm was not necessarily the one with
the highest willingness to pay, eliminating corruption might also result in a different firm
winning the contract and potentially higher quality (Celentani and Ganuza 2002).
Of course, all of these effects could potentially be muted if the requests for proposal
changed in response to e-procurement. For example, one might imagine that in response to
an intervention that made it more difficult for a procurement officer to direct a contract to
a particular bidder, the officer might change the contract requirements such that only the
desired firm could satisfy them. While this issue could arise, at least in India this is unlikely
to be a major force since the Indian road specifications are largely fixed by PMGSY program
guidelines.
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
In this section we describe the Indian and Indonesian datasets, followed by our empirical
strategy.
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2.3.1 Data
India
We obtain administrative data on costs, quality, and delays associated with each PMGSY
contract issued between January 2000 and August 2009 from multiple PMGSY websites.
The dataset covers 27 Indian states. For PMGSY, some road packages (sets of construction
projects and funding allocated by the federal government) are split into multiple tenders,
each with its own contract covering a subset of roads in the package. As a result, our
final dataset covers (at least partial information for) 30,578 packages and 35,610 associated
contracts.
A first set of outcomes are the cost outcomes associated with each contract. The estimated
cost is the amount budgeted (or “sanctioned” in the terminology of PMGSY) by the national
authority for construction of a specific road or set of roads in a package. A contract or
payment above this amount can only occur with permission from the national offices.
The contract value is the amount the government agrees to pay the winning firm for the
relevant work. The final payment records the total amount paid out for each package,
which as discussed above, may be distributed among multiple contracts and includes any
amendments to the contract that occur during construction.
We have measures of two key aspects of project quality: timeliness and physical project
quality. For timeliness, we track the time to execution. We use “late completion,” which is
an indicator variable taking value one if road construction work is not completed by the
date agreed to in the initial contract. We also construct a continuous “time overrun ratio”
variable, which is the ratio of actual to agreed upon time to completion.
To measure the quality of project implementation, we use quality reports submitted
by the National Quality Monitors (NQMs). During construction, PMGSY has a multi-tier
quality monitoring system, with local, state, and national monitoring. National monitoring
is conducted by NQMs who are retired engineers from other states. The assignment of
packages to NQMs is randomized and is therefore conducted similarly in places with and
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without electronic procurement.5 We focus on the outcomes of this national monitoring as
our quality outcome. NQMs evaluate each part of the work for material and workmanship
as per the format of the standardized “NQM Inspection Report,” indicating the tests carried
out and the test results obtained. Overall grading includes management issues, contract
management, and quality of work. We use a binary assessment (satisfactory/unsatisfactory)
of the technical fitness of the road at the time of inspection.
For a subset of packages in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and
Uttar Pradesh, we have bidding data. This includes the total number of bids submitted
in each auction. Before submitted bids are unsealed, engineers in each state decide which
firms have the technical ability (in training, equipment, and experience) to complete the
project based on materials firms submit with their bid. We also observe how many of the
submitted bids in each auction are judged to be from technically qualified firms.
Indonesia
We scraped data from the CTI and SEP websites of the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works,
capturing the complete universe of procurement from 2004 through 2008. Over 14,000
contracts from the MPW national headquarters and the 33 provincial offices are covered.
Each entry in the data is at the contract level and specifies the estimated cost, which is,
as in India, the maximum amount allowed by the MPW to be paid for a given contract.
Information on the type of project is available, as are all bidder names, bid amounts,
disqualifications, and final contract values.
We also have the dates on which the notice and details for each contract were first posted
online (and concurrently in traditional media), as well as the dates of bid opening and
contract award. For road projects (which represent a subset of all projects covered by the
Ministry of Public Works), we have a separate database from the road division that tracks
5The NQMs are given the letter of request once every two months for carrying out inspection for the
forthcoming two months. The NQMs are required to inspect three districts in a single visit in one state in each
of the two months. The letter of request allocates a mix of works in progress and completed works. The letter
indicates the specific location of works to be inspected and which are in-progress or completed works. Within a
block (the administrative unit below district), projects to be inspected are chosen on a random basis.
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the start dates and expected and actual completion dates for the services associated with
each contract. As with India, we construct “late completion” and “time overrun” variables.
No direct quality measure is available for Indonesia. For regressions which consider as an
outcome variable the above measures of the timeliness of completion, the number of firms
expressing interest (i.e. registering to access bidding documents), or the number of firms
bidding, we trim the top and bottom 1 percent of sample observations.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In the first column of Table 2.1, we present a set of basic descriptive statistics for the Indian
data, and in the remaining columns we present statistics from Indonesia. All monetary
variables are in logs, which is the form in which they will be used in the regressions below.
Examining the Indian data, in an average year for the typical state, the government
sanctioned almost 145 packages worth 9.61 log lakh rupees (approximately US$33 million at
exchange rates for 2005, the midpoint of our dataset; 1 lakh is 100,000 rupees) covering over
6.74 log kilometers (525 miles) of road. At the package level, the average log estimated cost
of completion over the period observed is 5.211 log lakh rupees (about US$416,000). In the
subset of auctions for which we have bidding data (as discussed above, these are from 4
states), there are an average of 2.7 total bids and 1.7 qualified bids.
One contract per package is the mode, but a long right tail is observed. On average, a
package is associated with 1.25 contracts for which we have data. Roads contracts generally
come in below estimated cost (most likely because exceeding estimated cost requires an
additional bureaucratic process). However, cost overruns with respect to the contracted
price are relatively common post-contracting. The average payment on completed projects
exceeds the average contract value by about 46 percent.
Turning to delays and quality, completion before the contracted due date was rare, with
more than three quarters of contracts finished after the assigned deadline and an average
delay of 244 days. There was heterogeneity in quality, with 72 percent of projects receiving
a satisfactory quality rating on first inspection.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
India Indonesia
All All Works Consulting
Mean Mean Mean Mean
(SD) Obs. (SD) Obs. (SD) Obs. (SD) Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State/Province-year level
Total projects 144.8 158 88.3 166 57.9 164 32.2 160
(184.9) (89.1) (40.3) (61.2)
Log total budget 9.610 158 25.674 166 25.610 164 22.886 160
(1.469) (0.944) (0.918) (1.156)
Package level
Log estimated cost 5.211 22,378 20.540 14,657 20.952 9,502 19.780 5,155
(0.846) (1.311) (1.350) (0.799)
Contracts in package 1.251 22,378
(1.088)
Log total value of 5.217 22,378
contracts in package (0.908)
Satisfactory quality 0.715 11,200
at first inspection (0.451)
Contract level
Log contract value 4.529 26,659 20.433 14,623 20.826 9,491 19.706 5,132
(2.044) (1.322) (1.381) (0.799)
Log final payment 4.914 14,813
(0.903)
Days completion 244.3 13,781
delay (345.4)
Number of firms 28.837 14,409 33.468 9,329 20.333 5,080
expressing interest (32.902) (38.967) (13.058)
Number of firms 2.756 1,628 5.842 14,521 7.298 9,414 3.158 5,107
bidding (3.075) (4.617) (5.083) (1.364)
Time notice 99.544 10,423 84.393 6,810 128.102 3,613
to award (110.258) (100.478) (121.642)
Time bid open 29.616 9,199 27.476 5,975 33.583 3,224
to award (29.672) (24.182) (37.477)
Winner won 0.109 34,126 0.282 9,575 0.212 6,893 0.463 2,682
in first year (0.312) (0.450) (0.408) (0.499)
Winner from same 0.302 12,913 0.734 6,096 0.817 4,152 0.556 1,944
district/province (0.459) (0.442) (0.387) (0.497)
Time overrun ratio 2.262 13,628 1.876 4,161 2.179 2,986 1.083 1,175
(3.018) (0.992) (0.991) (0.330)
Late 0.766 13,628 0.832 4,161 0.948 2,986 0.537 1,175
(0.423) (0.374) (0.223) (0.499)
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Examining the Indonesian data in Table 2.1, between 2004 and 2008 the average In-
donesian province auctioned about 88 contracts per year, with nearly twice as many works
as consulting projects, for a province-level average log total budget of 25.67 log rupiah
(approximately US$15 million at 2006 exchange rates). At the project level, the average log
estimated cost for works projects is 20.95 log rupiah (about US$140,000) and for consulting
projects is 19.78 log rupiah (approximately US$43,000). The final contract value for a given
project is on average 10 percent lower than the official estimated cost provided by the
government prior to bidding. Firms winning contracts are typically based in the same
province as the contract, more than 80 percent so for works projects. As with the data from
India, delays are common; nearly all works projects (95 percent) and more than half of
consulting projects (54 percent) are completed later than the initially agreed upon date.
2.3.3 Empirical Strategy
We estimate impacts separately for India and Indonesia. In both cases, we make use of a
difference-in-differences strategy, but our implementation differs slightly across countries,
as described below.
In India, for road package or contract i in state s which began in year t we estimate the
following OLS specification:
yist = as + bt + mEPROCst + X0istg+ eist (2.1)
where i is a package or contract, s is a state, and t is a year, and EPROCst is a dummy for
e-procurement adoption by state s as of year t. Controls Xist are log estimated cost and log
road length.6 All regressions include state (as) and year (bt) fixed effects. In some cases
we collapse the package-level data to the state level and estimate regressions using annual
state-level data. In all cases we cluster standard errors by state.
6For India, the R-squared values from regressions of e-procurement on log road length and log estimated
cost range from 0.0004 to 0.081, depending on the year. For Indonesia, the R-squared values from regressions of
project-level e-procurement on log estimated cost range between 0.001 to 0.022 for works projects and between
0.000 to 0.125 for consulting projects, depending on the year.
70
In Indonesia, the availability of e-procurement at the province level does not necessarily
imply that all projects within a province will be contracted using the system.7 To obtain the
average impacts of the use of e-procurement, we instrument for actual e-procurement use
with the adoption of e-procurement in the province, as follows. The regression of interest
(i.e. the second stage) is:
yist = as + bt + qEPROCPACKAGEist + dXist + eist (2.2)
where EPROCPACKAGEist is a dummy for e-procurement use in project i in province s as
of year t. The project level e-procurement variable EPROCPACKAGEist is instrumented
with EPROCst, which is a dummy for whether e-procurement has been adopted by province
s as of time t.8 The control variable Xist is the log estimated cost (since we have many
different types of projects and there is no metric available in the data other than estimated
cost, we cannot control for road length as for India). Standard errors are clustered by
province.
In our regression tables we typically report results for the India sample as Panel A,
Indonesia works projects as Panel B and Indonesia consulting projects as Panel C .
2.3.4 Identification Check
Since the adoption of e-procurement is not randomly assigned, we need to ensure that the
timing of e-procurement adoption is not correlated with differential trends in procurement
that would have occurred in the absence of e-procurement.
To examine this, we begin by checking whether, overall, the adoption of e-procurement
is associated with a change in the volume (total budget for procurement) or structure (i.e.,
across how many contracts procurement is distributed) in a given state or province. Column
(1) of Table 2.2 reports regressions where the dependent variable is log total estimated cost
7It is possible that this is true for India as well, but for India we do not observe what fraction of packages
actually used e-procurement in a given year.
8The first-stage coefficient and F-statistic for works projects are, respectively, 0.359 and 40.79 and for
consultancy projects are 0.491 and 78.11.
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at the state-year level and the explanatory variable of interest is an indicator for any contract
being awarded under e-procurement, with log of road length included as a control for
India. Column (2) repeats the exercise using number of projects as the dependent variable,
controlling for log total state-year estimated project cost. In neither country do we see
a significant impact of e-procurement adoption on the total budget allocations (column
1) or the number of projects they are broken into (column 2) at the state/province-level,
suggesting that e-procurement was not coincident with major changes in the amount or
structure of contracts being procured.9
Second, we examine whether the year of official adoption of e-procurement at the state
level (conditional on e-procurement occurring after the first two years in our data – that
is, after 2005 in Indonesia or after 2001 in India) is significantly related to the difference in
log average contract value between the first two years of the data (i.e., between 2001 and
2000 for India (Appendix Table B.1, Panel A) and between 2005 and 2004 for Indonesia
(Appendix Table B.1, Panels B and C)). Regressing these early contract value differences on
e-procurement can suggest whether differential initial trends predict the year of subsequent
e-procurement adoption. We see no correlation between change in state-level contract value
and the timing of e-procurement for either India or Indonesia.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Did E-procurement Change the Contracting Process?
Contracting Execution
In Table 2.3 we first examine whether the introduction of e-procurement has an impact on
the duration of the project contracting phase. In columns (1) and (2) we consider the time
elapsed between tender notice and contract award and between bid opening and contract
award. Both variables are available only for the Indonesia sample. While neither variable
is significantly impacted for works projects, we find an increase of 54.15 days (statistically
9We find a similar null result for e-procurement’s effect on log road length.
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Table 2.2: Budget impact
State-year level
Log total Number of
estimated cost projects
at state-year in state-year
(1) (2)
Panel A. India
E-procurement -0.041 -54.39
(0.089) (60.72)
Mean Dep. Var. (Non-Eproc) 9.55 139.20
(1.41) (184.07)
Observations 157 157
Panel B. Indonesia - Works Projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.187 -3.559
(0.151) (7.069)
Mean Dep. Var. (Non-Eproc) 25.211 45.102
(0.774) (28.803)
Observations 164 164
Panel C. Indonesia - Consultancy Projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.374 7.641
(0.226) (8.486)
Mean Dep. Var (Non-Eproc) 22.306 15.831
(0.888) (10.009)
Observations 160 160
Notes: India - Column (1) reports estimates from an OLS regression of log total estimated cost at the state-year
level on an indicator for any contract being awarded under e-procurement in the respective state and year.
Column (2) does the same using number of packages as the dependent variable. Log of road length and log of
estimated cost are included as controls when not on the LHS. Indonesia - Columns (1) and (2) give results from
OLS regressions at the state-year level, where the dependent variable is given in the table and the independent
variable is the official adoption of electronic procurement at the state level. Column (2) includes a control
for log total state-year estimated project cost. Both regressions include state and year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses below estimates. Means for each dependent variable are
also reported, with standard deviations in parentheses. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.
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significant at the 1 percent level), a more than 50 percent increase, in the time elapsed
between the tender notice and awarding of contract for consulting projects. In conjunction
with the absence of an effect in column (2) on the amount of time between bid opening
and award, this implies that for consulting projects e-procurement increased the period of
time between the tender notice and the opening of bidding, in which firms can learn about
potential contracts and prepare their bid documents.
Who Bids and Who Wins?
We next consider indicators of changing contractor identity. In column (3) of Table 2.3 we
investigate the impact of e-procurement on the number of firms who express an interest
in bidding. These data are only available for Indonesia. For nearly every works project,
this process entails registering to be allowed to download the detailed bid documents
and participate in bid submission. For all consulting projects and a small subset of works
projects, expression of interest involves the submission of a pre-qualification document on
which firms are scored and a subset of those passing are chosen to submit bids. The number
of firms expressing interest in the case of works projects more than doubles.
In column (4) we examine the number of firms submitting a complete bid. This number
is relatively low in India with the average manual procurement contract receiving roughly
2.9 bids. This number is higher for Indonesia at over 7 bids per works project and 3.2 per
consulting project. However, in no instance does the average number of bids increase due to
e-procurement.
Column (5) examines whether e-procurement changes the likelihood that the winning
firm is based in the same area in which a project is tendered. While a variable for contractor
home province was available directly in the Indonesian data, we proxy for firm default
location in India with the modal district among those in which the contractor was observed
with contracts prior to e-procurement starting anywhere in the country.10 In general, as
10In India, the only consistent firm identification data we observe is a unique ID within states which does not
link across states. Since some firms are not observed prior to the start of e-procurement, the location variable is
undefined for these firms and the associated observations are excluded from this regression.
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Table 2.3: Contract process
Time Time Number Winner
elapsed elapsed of Number from Winner
notice bid firms of same in
to open to expressing firms province/ first
award award interest bidding district year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. India
E-procurement 0.364 -0.108*** 0.0222
[0.733] (0.029) (0.0218)
Mean Dep. Var. (Non-Eproc) 2.86 0.581 0.141
(3.52) (0.493) (0.348)
Observations 1,406 6,545 26,246
Panel B. Indonesia -
Works Projects
E-procurement (IV) 48.75 -2.54 24.735* 0.420 -0.036 0.069
(38.24) (6.93) (13.657) (1.520) (0.057) (0.060)
Mean Dep. Var. (Non-Eproc) 64.90 25.33 17.456 7.005 0.816 0.245
(71.20) (29.43) (21.460) (5.057) (0.387) (0.430)
Observations 6,804 5,974 9,323 9,408 4,151 6,892
Panel C. Indonesia -
Consultancy Projects
E-procurement (IV) 54.15*** 9.88 -3.489 -0.242 -0.233* 0.414**
(19.10) (6.19) (2.561) (0.281) (0.133) (0.183)
Mean Dep. Var. (Non-Eproc) 98.01 26.13 11.069 3.178 0.650 0.446
(101.20) (48.53) (6.174) (1.468) (0.477) (0.497)
Observations 3,611 3,223 5,078 5,107 1,944 2,682
Notes: India - All columns report OLS estimates from a regression at the contract level of the listed variable on an
indicator for the contract being awarded using e-procurement. Column (4) is estimated on a subset of contracts
for which we have bidding data in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh.
Column (5) defines the district which a contractor is from as the modal district of the contractor’s observed
contracts prior to e-procurement starting anywhere in the country. This regression is therefore restricted to
contracts won by the cohort of contractors who were awarded contracts prior to e-procurement. Winner in
first year (Column (6)) is an indicator for the winner having been awarded a contract in 2000 or 2001. This
regression is restricted to observations after the first year. State and year fixed effects as well as controls for log
of road length and log of estimated cost are included. Indonesia - All columns report IV estimates at the project
level, where the dependent variable is given in the table and the independent variable is the contract-level
use of electronic procurement, instrumented by the official adoption of electronic procurement at the state
level. Values of time elapsed in columns (1) and (2) were available for a subset of provinces in 2004 and all
provinces in subsequent years. Column (5) defines the province where the contractor is from as the province
as that directly indicated in the data. This regression therefore excludes contracts based out of the national
headquarters. Column (6) defines winner in first year as an indicator for the winner having been awarded a
contract in 2004. This regression is restricted to observations after the first year in the data. State and year fixed
effects as well as a control for log of estimated cost are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. Where brackets are used, p-values are given using the wild bootstrap method. Non-e-procurement project
means for each dependent variable are also reported, with standard deviations in parentheses. *Significant at 10
percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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with most construction projects, where moving equipment is quite costly and where there is
often a need for local sources of materials (e.g., hot asphalt), there is a strong tendency to
be local: In India nearly 60 percent of winning bids come from firms located in the same
district and in Indonesia over 80 percent of works contracts are won by firms from the same
province.
We observe a significant 11 percentage point decline in this variable in India and a
23 percentage point decline for consultancy projects in Indonesia. Given that it is much
easier to move engineers geographically than to move heavy equipment and asphalt plants,
it is not surprising that the impacts for Indonesia – where cross-provincial distances are
much greater than the cross-district distances we observe in India – are concentrated among
consulting projects.
Finally, we examine in column (6) whether e-procurement changed entry of new firms.
Specifically, we examine whether the winning bidder was present and won a contract bid
in the first year of our data (2000 or 2001 for districts in India or 2004 for provinces in
Indonesia). This regression is restricted to observations which fall in years subsequent to
these initial years. We observe a highly significant increase of 41 percentage points for
consultancy projects in Indonesia, showing that e-procurement leads to more contracts
being won by pre-existing winning firms. Combined with column (5), this suggests that
e-procurement leads to projects being won by pre-existing firms from other provinces.
One consistent explanation for these findings is that e-procurement improves access to
information for firms outside the area where procurement is taking place. This is a relatively
larger benefit for firms that are farther away and may also favor pre-existing firms with a
documented record of success.
2.4.2 Did E-Procurement Change Procurement Outcomes?
There are three main outcome variables about which the government cares when procuring
for the provision of a service/construction of a project: the price it pays for the contract, the
timeliness with which the contract is executed, and the quality of work undertaken. In this
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section we examine the impact of e-procurement on each of these three dimensions.
Prices
To examine the impact on prices paid, we first consider impacts in each country on the
contract value agreed upon between the winning bidder and the government. Column
(1) of Table 2.4 shows no statistically significant impact in India on log contract value,
conditional on the log length of the road and the log estimated cost of the road. The point
estimate is quite small – 0.02 – and the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from -0.027 to
0.064. This means that we can reject the hypothesis that there was more than 3 percent cost
savings associated with e-procurement, based on the original contract value. For Indonesia,
conditional on the log estimated cost, the point estimates for both works and consultancy
projects suggest small reductions in log contract value, though they are not statistically
significant. The confidence intervals suggest that, at 95 percent confidence, we can rule out
price declines in Indonesia of more than 14.1 percent for works projects and of more than
6.6 percent for consulting projects.
Of course, the government does not care about the contract value, per se; rather, the
more important measure is the actual amount paid to the contractor. Cost overruns are
frequent, so as discussed above, the amount paid is typically higher than the contract value.
Column (2) examines the impact on the final amount actually paid by the government,
including any overruns or contract amendments. Values for this variable are only available
for India. Note that the observation count falls substantially here since not all packages
were complete at the time of data collection.11 Again, no significant impact is observed.
The point estimate for India is a 2.5 percent drop in final payments, with the 95 percent
confidence interval ranging from a 8.7 percent decrease to a 3.7 percent increase. Given
the uncertainly around this point estimate and that of the effect on contract values, we are
not able to infer whether changes in final payments, if any, came through shifts in contract
11As we show subsequently, the date to completion is unaffected by e-procurement, so this type of sample
selection is unlikely to be of concern.
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values or changes in cost overruns. On net, the evidence in this section suggests that there
was no statistically detectable impact on prices paid for projects, and to the extent there are
effects we cannot detect, they are not overwhelming in size.
Project Timeliness
We next examine the first measure of quality of execution: delays in the execution of projects.
In column (3) of Table 2.4 we consider late completion – a dummy taking value 1 if a project
is finished after the contracted completion date and 0 otherwise.12 Late completion is very
common in both countries. More than three quarters of projects in India are completed late,
while 95 percent of works projects and more than half of consultancy projects in Indonesia
are not finished on time. In the case of Indonesian works projects, we see a significant 16
percentage point decline in this variable associated with the adoption of e-procurement. We
then consider the time overrun ratio in column (4). This is the actual time to completion
divided by the contracted time to completion. For both India and Indonesian works projects,
we observe high levels of overrun – on average, actual time to completion is more than
double the contracted time. However, in neither country do we see a significant decline
associated with adoption of e-procurement.13
Quality
In the final four columns of Table 2.4, we turn to package-level physical quality measures
from a nation-wide auditing process. As described above, these data only exist for the
India sample. The Indian National Quality Monitoring process is coordinated centrally,
and inspectors audit a randomly selected bundle of roads (both in progress and complete).
Specifically, for auditing roads in a given season, the national monitor is told how many
12We do not find significant effects of e-procurement on target timeline length in either India or Indonesia.
13Note that for Indonesian works, the point estimate on the time over-run ratio is positive while the dummy
on late completion is negative. This is due to a few extreme outliers. If we trim the bottom and top 2.5 percent
of observations, the coefficient and statistical significance in column (3) are essentially unchanged, but the point
estimate in column (4) becomes -0.025, not statistically significant.
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of each type of project (complete and ongoing) to sample and from which districts in a
state. He then separately samples at random from the lists of projects provided by the state
road department. In addition, inspectors are allocated follow-up audits for roads, and here,
poorly graded roads are oversampled.
Thus, only the first quality grade is randomly selected. We examine two variables: the
first quality grade and the minimal quality grade for the road project given by the national
monitor. The minimum quality grade is the lowest quality grade given during any of the
inspector evaluations across all contracts in the package. The quality score is measured as
either 0 (unsatisfactory) or 1 (satisfactory). We separately consider quality outcomes for all
projects (including those in progress) and for only completed roads.
In columns (6) and (8), we find highly significant impacts on both the first and minimum
quality grades for completed roads. E-procurement is associated with increases of 12.3 and
19.4 percentage points in the first quality grade and worst quality grade, respectively. In
contrast, we do not see any significant impacts on incomplete works (columns 5 and 7). The
evaluation of incomplete projects may be inherently prone to greater measurement error
because a project is behind schedule, being revised, or is simply not far along enough to
be accurately judged. We see no evidence in the data that e-procurement leads to more
abandoned (never completed) contracts or to a differential number of incomplete projects at
the time of inspection, suggesting that the difference in significance of the quality estimates
cannot be explained by e-procurement driving low-quality contracts to an even lower level
that results in unfinished construction.
2.4.3 Selecting Better Contractors, or Making Existing Contractors Better?
We observe significant impacts of e-procurement on road quality in India and evidence of
reductions in delays in Indonesia. We also find that winning contractors are more likely
to come from outside areas. We now explore a potential channel of influence: whether
e-procurement changed the pool of contractors who bid and caused better contractors to be
selected.
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To the extent that e-procurement improves outcomes, an important question is whether
it does so by selecting better contractors, or by encouraging existing contractors to perform
better. Selection effects would occur if the main effects described above were primarily
driven by e-procurement spurring new entrants, and if those new entrants won; treatment
effects on existing contractors could occur if increased competition or lower corruption led
these incumbent firms to submit higher quality bids.
To investigate these possibilities, we conduct a two-stage strategy where we first estimate
a fixed effect for each firm in the data. This measures each firm’s average quality. We then
examine whether e-procurement leads to the selection of higher quality firms. If it does –
and if these coefficients match the overall effects documented above – we can then conclude
that selection effects play a large role. On the other hand, if e-procurement does not change
average firm quality, then the quality and delay effects documented above must be arising
through increased performance from a given set of incumbent firms.
For each outcome of interest y, we initially estimate the following regression:
yicst = tc + as + at + dEPROCst + X0icstg+ eicst (2.3)
where tc is a winning contractor fixed effect and EPROCst is a dummy for e-procurement
adoption in state s as of year t.14 We include state/province and year fixed effects and
controls as before. We generate a full set of contractor fixed effects from this regression and
then use them as the outcome variable in the following regression:
tist = as + at + bEPROCst + X0istg+ eist (2.4)
where tist is the estimated tc from the initial regression for the contractor winning project
ist. The estimation is weighted by the inverse variance of tc (as estimated from the first
stage). This regression asks how e-procurement affected the choice of which contractors
14For Indonesia, we additionally include the dummy variable, EPROCPACKAGEicst, to account for the fact
that e-procurement adoption at the state level does not imply that all projects in that province will be tendered
using e-procurement.
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won a given package.15 Standard errors are clustered by both state and winning contractor
in each stage.
Examining prices in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.5, we find no evidence suggesting
that the introduction of e-procurement was accompanied in either India or Indonesia with
the selection of winning firms that tend to make lower or higher winning bid amounts for a
given estimated cost.
We then examine delays. In column (3), we see that for works projects in Indonesia,
e-procurement was associated with firms that tended to be less late being more likely to win.
The magnitude of the coefficient – 0.058 – is about one-third of the equivalent magnitude
in column (3) of Table 2.4 – 0.161 – which suggests that one-third of the effect is driven
by changes in selection, while two-thirds of the effect is driven by existing contractors
performing better.
We also find substantial impacts on the average quality of contractors, as shown in
columns (6) and (8). The magnitudes of these coefficients are between fifty and eighty
percent of those for the overall quality effects in Table 2.4. This suggests that the quality effect
is driven primarily by higher quality contractors being selected rather than by increased
competition improving the quality of existing contractors.16
2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides some of the first rigorous evidence on the impact of e-procurement
on contractual choice and subsequent contract outcomes. All told, the results present a
15For Indonesia as before, we use EPROCPACKAGEist instrumented with EPROCst in this regression.
16In addition to improvements in terms of price and quality, ensuring the participation of smaller firms
may be an outcome that is desirable from the perspective of the government and influenced by the structure
of procurement (Krasnokutsaya and Seim, 2011). To address the possibility of such effects here, we examine
whether winning contractors under e-procurement are more likely to be large firms, as proxied by whether they
tend to be involved with larger projects (results available from authors). In India, e-procurement is associated
with such a change when we consider the outcome of log road length, but there is no significant impact for
estimated project cost. In Indonesia, we see some increase in contractor size for works projects but it is very
noisily estimated, while no effect is observed for consulting projects. These results suggest that e-procurement
results in minor, if any, changes in the distribution of winning firm size.
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consistent story. E-procurement appears to have led to increased ability of firms from outside
the home region to win contracts. These firms, in turn, tended to be higher quality firms in
general, as measured by their average delay times (in Indonesia) and average construction
quality (in India). This led to improvements in the quality of roads and timeliness but no
detectable changes in price.
Following the increase in competition among firms for contracts brought about by the
adoption of e-procurement, a reduction in the rents accruing to winning firms may be
expected to occur either through an increase in quality for a given price or a decrease in
price for a given level of quality. In both the Indian and Indonesian settings examined
here, we see evidence in support of improvements in quality for a given price. The fact
that we observe changes on the quality margin, and that it occurs through changing which
contractors win rather than the performance of a given set of winning contracts, suggests
that the system prior to e-procurement was not necessarily selecting the most efficient firms,
and that e-procurement may have improved efficiency even if it did not necessarily lower
prices paid. It also suggests that the practice of giving contracts to the lowest price bidder
likely contributed to greater inefficiencies on the quality margin.
Overall, our findings provide qualified support to the view that e-governance can
improve the provision of public services. E-procurement was a partial reform which
changed the application process but neither the rules for technical qualification nor the
requirement that the lowest price bidder receive the contract. Case-study evidence suggests
that official discretion in determining technical disqualification is often an important way
of limiting competition. Equally, emphasizing price over quality (as occurs when lowest
price bidder always wins) implies that bidders build in their profit margins by cutting
back on quality. E-procurement facilitated entry but left significant discretion with officials
in determining qualification, and the bidding rules continued to prioritize low price over
quality. Thus, it appears that the main impact we see can be attributed to gains from trade
associated with having reduced barriers to entry. It is an open question whether a reform
package which changes both the application process and also the process of selecting among
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bidders could lead to even larger gains in economic efficiency.
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Chapter 3
Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Impacts of
Open Meetings in U.S. State
Legislatures
3.1 Introduction
Increases in institutional transparency in democracies are commonly assumed to improve
outcomes of policy making. Efforts have been undertaken in the United States to increase
the information available on national legislator behavior through the government creation
and maintenance of publicly available online databases (Lessig, 2009). The European
Parliament has also recently demanded greater transparency from the EU Council of
Ministers (Gräßle, 2009). Additionally, as nascent democracies in the developing world
refine their institutional structures, increasing openness across the various branches of
government is often a central goal. While proponents of greater transparency emphasize the
benefits of increased accountability and responsiveness of elected representatives, theory
suggests that greater transparency need not lead to beneficial consequences for the general
public, even excluding special cases such as the possible jeopardy of national security or
violation of individual rights.
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This paper provides empirical evidence in the U.S. setting on the effects of the enactment
of statutes that guarantee public access to state legislatures, hereafter referred to as open
meetings laws. I first examine the impact of open meetings on the total numbers of
bills introduced and enacted and on the timeliness with which the state budget, arguably
the most important piece of legislative output, is delivered. As a more direct measure
of whether legislators are incentivized to take actions with important economic impacts,
state government expenditure is considered as an outcome. I finally examine how open
meetings influence citizens’ perceptions of government and their behavior in elections to
state legislatures.
In addition to considering the average impacts of open meetings on these outcomes, I
investigate how the impacts of open meetings may be mediated by the level of geographic
isolation of the state legislature from its constituents. Campante and Do (2014) find that
states with more isolated capital cities, in terms of average log weighted distance from the
population, have weaker accountability and worse government performance. It is reasonable
then to expect that the effects of increasing transparency through open meetings may differ
in the isolation of the state government, due to differences across states both in the baseline
level of quality of government and in the effective magnitude of the change in public
informedness associated with open meetings.
I find first that open meetings decrease legislative enactments by roughly 11 percent,
but do not impact the amount of bills introduced. No effects on average are observed on
the timeliness of state budgets. Open meetings increase expenditure on public goods by
more than 5 percent on average. I also find evidence that these expenditure effects are
concentrated in areas with greater state capital isolation, where government spending on
public goods is lower to begin with.
Open meetings also shift citizens’ perceptions of state government, such that respondents
are 20 percent more likely to express at least moderate confidence in the government. An
examination of heterogeneity in impacts by capital isolation shows that the effects are driven
by gains in low isolation areas. In states with a greater average log weighted distance of the
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population from the capital, open meetings actually increase the proportion of respondents
choosing the lowest possible measure of confidence.
Mirroring this pattern, I observe significant differences in the impact of open meetings
on voting outcomes by the isolation of the capital. Whereas incumbents in low isolation
locations see their vote shares increase with open meetings, those where the capital is more
remote experience a decrease in vote share. Given that incumbents in elections to state
legislatures win on average by more than 30 percentage points, these vote share effects are
unsurprisingly not large enough to significantly impact the likelihood of incumbent victory.
This paper contributes to a literature demonstrating the importance of public awareness
in upholding the monitoring and accountability of politicians. Ferraz and Finan (2008)
find that re-election impacts on Brazilian mayors following random audits depend both on
the severity of corruption problems revealed in their municipalities and the level of radio
coverage. Besley and Burgess (2002) show that state governments in India increase public
relief in response to negative agricultural shocks when newspaper circulation is higher.
Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) provide experimental evidence in the Ugandan context
that the dissemination of parliamentary scorecards to the public did not lead to improved
politician performance or election impacts, and suggest that this is at least in part because
constituents remained poorly informed despite dissemination campaigns.
Djankov et al. (2010) conduct a 175 country study which finds that public disclosure
of income sources and business connections of MPs is associated with lower perceived
corruption and better government. In contrast, they find no similar systematic relation when
disclosure is made only to specific government agencies, indicating that public awareness is
important in holding politicians accountable. In the U.S. context, Snyder and Strömberg
(2010) determine that House representatives subject to increased press coverage exhibit
greater effort in serving their constituencies and capture a larger share of votes when
running for re-election. This paper focuses on the impacts of an alternative mechanism,
open meetings, through which information on the activity of elected officials is made more
accessible to the public.
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides a conceptual framework. Section
3.3 describes the background and data, and Section 3.4 covers the identification strategy.
Section 3.5 details the results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework
Is greater transparency necessarily beneficial?
A sizeable body of work has provided theoretical and, increasingly, empirical evidence in
support of the beneficial impacts of heightening the transparency of democratic governments.
With improved access to information, the argument goes, citizens are better able to evaluate
the performance and quality of politicians and hold them accountable via the electoral
process, reducing the scope for moral hazard and over time improving the selection of
officials.
It is not a given, however, that greater transparency will necessarily improve outcomes
from the public perspective. Prat (2005) presents a model that highlights the importance in
a principal-agent setting of distinguishing between revealing more information about agent
actions versus about the consequences of those actions. In contexts where it is difficult to
evaluate fully the consequences of agent choices, increasing information about the actions
themselves may increase the incentive of the agent to disregard valuable private information
when choosing what to do (“conformism”).
Relatedly, Stasavage (2004) considers settings where decisions require compromise
among multiple agents. He demonstrates that under certain circumstances increasing
the transparency of the bargaining process can lead to costly delays or breakdown in the
decision making process, as representatives’ incentive to adopt less compromising bargaining
positions in an effort to signal quality to constituents is strengthened (“posturing”). As
bargaining among multiple representative is inherent to the legislative process and open
meetings laws primarily increase the information available to the public about the actions of
legislators, as opposed to their consequences, concerns of these types may be particularly
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relevant.
How do impacts vary with state isolation?
Campante and Do (2014) establish that the isolation of state government from the public
is robustly associated with greater corruption, worse public goods provision, and weaker
accountability – lower newspaper coverage of state politics, reduced voter knowledge of
and interest in state politics, and lower turnout in state elections. State capital isolation
may then mediate the impacts of the adoption of open meetings in legislatures through two
channels. First, for a given increase in transparency, the content of the new information
being revealed may differ. In more isolated states, where the status quo is one of lower
quality government performance, increasing the information available to the public may
give re-election-minded officials a stronger incentive to take action in response (though
given the monitoring/accountability vs conformism/posturing tensions, whether this is
ultimately beneficial from the public perspective is ambiguous).
Second, a given de jure change in transparency may differ in its de facto impact on
information levels depending on the initial isolation of the legislature. In less isolated
locations, the public may already be relatively well-informed, so that adoption of open
meetings results in a smaller effective increase in information. This impact would be in the
same direction as the content effect, with legislators reacting more strongly to open meetings
in more isolated settings. On the other hand, uptake of newly available information may be
lower in more isolated locations due to weaker newspaper coverage of politics and lower
voter interest. Additionally, if more isolated state capitals are more corrupt, legislators
may be more adept at circumventing open meetings regulations or otherwise suppressing
information. These latter two possibilities suggest that in more isolated locations open
meetings would yield a smaller effective increase in the publics’ knowledge, dampening
legislators incentives to change behavior in response.
Overall, it is theoretically ambiguous whether on average the adoption of open meetings
in the legislative setting is beneficial from the public perspective and how this may vary
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across states with more or less isolated capitals. Given the theoretical uncertainty, an
empirical investigation is valuable in helping to improve our understanding of which of the
potential forces are dominant in the U.S. legislative setting and whether future initiatives
aimed at further increasing state government transparency should be tailored differently
depending on the isolation of the state capital.
3.3 Background and data
3.3.1 Open meetings
The primary source of information on state level open meetings laws used in this paper is
The Open Government Guide, published by The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press. The aim of this guide is to provide comprehensive information on open government
law and practice in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. It provides outlines
detailing the history of open government laws in each state and the rights of reporters and
citizens to attend meetings and obtain records of the various branches of state and local
governments.1 The guide also gives information on compliance and enforcement of the laws
in each state, as well as relevant related court decisions. These outlines were complemented
by information gathered from various Attorney General’s opinions, the Book of the States,
and Ballotpedia.org.
Using these sources, I determine for each year whether a statute requiring open access
to government meetings that applies to the state legislature had yet been enacted,2 taking
into account information on how binding are the requirements of each statute, i.e. whether
or not unclear language or other potential loopholes were included.3 As shown in Figure
1Volunteer attorneys with expertise in open government and access laws in each state prepared the outlines
in 1989 and have provided updates regularly since, most recently in 2011.
2While some states may have open meetings precedents set in common law or constitutional provisions
which can be interpreted as requiring them, I focus on statutory law because it in general defines more clearly
the degree to which open meetings laws are applicable to the state legislature and is therefore more binding.
3I also consider whether later legislation or judicial rulings weakened the original law, so that a state may
shift back to not having open meetings. This occurs in 3 instances: Alaska (1987), Indiana (1993), and Wisconsin
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Figure 3.1: Timing of open meetings adoption across states
3.1, 36 states switched to having such an open meetings law between 1950 and 2010, with 75
percent of these changes occurring betwen 1972 and 1978.
3.3.2 State capital isolation
I use the measure of state government isolation from Campante and Do (2014), the average
log distance of the state’s population to the capital city.4 The authors find that isolated state
capitals are strongly associated with greater corruption, lower public goods provision, and
weaker accountability – lower newspaper coverage, lower voter interest in and knowledge
of state politics, and reduced turnout in state elections. The authors compute the measure
(2011).
4More precisely, the log county population weighted average distance of each county centroid from the
state capital, defined as the coordinates of the State House or Assembly.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of state capital isolation
for each of the 48 continental states in each census year between 1920 and 2000. To remain
consistent in the government isolation variable definition, given that I consider outcomes
from as early as 1951, I use states’ log average distance values from 1950 in all regressions.5
The variable ranges in value between least isolated at 0.423 to most isolated at 0.848, with a
mean of 0.688 (see Figure 3.2).
5Results are little changed throughout with use instead of the 1920 values, 1920-1950 means, or, for outcomes
in later time ranges, the 1960 or 1970 values.
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3.3.3 Legislative measures
The primary measures considered by legislatures are bills and resolutions. A bill is a
proposal to establish a new law or to change or repeal an existing law, while resolutions
vary in force of law and often merely express sentiments or opinions of the legislature. I
therefore focus on bills in my analysis. The typical process of bill consideration begins with
the drafting and introduction of a bill to a house of the legislature by one of its members.
The bill is then referred to a committee based on subject matter. If the committee reports
in favor of the bill, the measure is then considered by the entire house. Contingent upon a
majority vote to pass the bill, it is referred to the other house of the legislature, where it
is subject to the same committee and vote procedure. The bill may also be approved with
amendments, in which case it is returned to the original house for re-consideration in its
new form. If the bill passes both houses, it is presented to the governor for approval and
enactment. In the case of a veto, the legislature may override the decision by supermajority
vote in both houses.
A unique state-level panel dataset for the total numbers of bills introduced and enacted
by each state legislature was collected by the author from the Book of the States for the years
1971 to 2000.6 I collapse the legislation counts into two year session-level totals categorized
into odd-numbered years ranging from 1971 to 1999.7 As shown in Panel A of Table 3.1,
approximately 3,600 bills were introduced and 860 enacted on average per legislative session
over the sample time period. A large amount of variation exists across states, with a standard
deviation in introductions of roughly 4,200. For this reason, legislative outcomes are taken
in log form in subsequent regressions.
State budget delays have been used previously as a measure of legislative gridlock and
6Relevant information on legislative resolutions and bills was gathered from tables in the yearly volumes of
The Book of the States for 1951-2000. From 1951 to 1954, total legislative enactments were available for each state,
undifferentiated between bills and resolutions. The numbers of introductions and enactments combined for
bills and resolutions were available for 1955 to 1970. Beginning in 1971, the total distinct numbers of introduced
and enacted bills and resolutions were available. Therefore, the timeframe of focus is 1971 to 2000.
7Nine states have annual legislative sessions during the sample time period and three states have biennial
legislative sessions beginning in even-numbered years during the sample time period. The remainder have
biennial legislative sessions beginning in odd-numbered years.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Obs.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Legislative activity
Bills introduced 3,632.5 4,268.4 678
Bills enacted 862.7 534.3 683
Late budget 0.156 0.363 1,792
Days budget late 4.96 19.99 1,792
Panel B. State direct expenditure (in millions)
All 10,827.2 15,285.8 2,790
Public goods 5,317.6 7,469.7 2,790
Health/hospitals 872.6 1,209.0 2,790
Education 2,044.3 2,517.4 2,790
Public welfare 2,400.8 4,032.9 2,790
Panel C. Elections
Number of candidates 1.780 0.618 105,171
Incumbent present 0.767 0.423 105,171
Any non-incumbent 0.736 0.441 105,171
Total votes 21,277.0 27,692.5 100,308
Incumbent vote share (cond. on challenge) 0.628 0.111 52,874
Incumbent victory (cond. on challenge) 0.904 0.295 52,874
Notes: Bill introduction/enactment data ranges from 1971-2000. Budget lateness data ranges from 1961-2006.
Expenditure data ranges from 1951 to 2006. Elections data ranges from 1968-2010.
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bargaining failure (Binder 2003, Andersen et al. 2012, Klarner et al. 2012). In addition,
characteristics which one would expect to make the bargaining process and compromise
more difficult, such as divided government, have been found to increase budget delays. Data
on state budget lateness, as well and legislative and gubernatorial characteristics, for the
1961-2010 period was kindly provided by Carl Klarner. Table 3.1 shows that state budgets
are late, i.e. adopted after the start of the fiscal year, more than 15 percent of the time, for
an average lateness of 5 days. Conditional on being late, average lateness rises to 32 days.
3.3.4 State expenditure
Yearly state-level direct expenditure data are taken from the “State Government Finances”
report series of the U.S. Census Bureau for the years 1951 to 2006.8 Total yearly state
expenditure is the sum of direct and intergovernmental expenditure. Intergovernmen-
tal expenditure is defined as “amounts paid to other governments as fiscal aid in the
form of shared revenues and grants-in-aid, as reimbursements for performance of general
government activities and for specific services for the paying government, or in lieu of
taxes”. Direct expenditure is officially defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as “payments to
employees, suppliers, contractors, beneficiaries, and other final recipients of government
payments–i.e., all expenditure other than intergovernmental expenditure”. I focus on states’
direct government expenditure, given its clearer interpretation and the fact that it comprises
nearly 75 percent of total expenditure on average over this period.
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for direct expenditure in total as well as
for public goods, which I follow Campate and Do (2014) in defining as the sum of health
and hospitals, education, and public welfare. Total annual state direct expenditure averages
roughly $10.8 billion (inflation adjusted each year to 2012 USD terms), with nearly one half
of this expenditure going towards the public goods categories. As would be expected given
differences in the size of states and their economies, there is also a great deal of variance in
spending outcomes, so outcomes are considered in logs.
8Portions of the data were obtained directly from the Census Bureau as well as from Baicker et al. (2012).
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3.3.5 Confidence in government
Gallup State of the Nation Surveys were conducted in 1972, 1974, and 1976, covering a
nationally representative sample of voting age individuals.9 Importantly for the purposes
of this paper, these waves fall during the period in which many of the switches in open
meetings occurred and each survey included identically the question: “How much trust
and confidence do you have in the government of the state where you live when it comes to
handling state problems?”, where respondents were asked to respond on a 4-point scale
ranging from “None at all” to “A great deal”. I collapse the data to the state-year level, at
which the mean value is 2.89, with a standard deviation of 0.83.
3.3.6 Government characteristics and election outcomes
I obtain information on candidates and vote totals for the universe of elections to state
legislatures spanning the years 1968-2010 from the dataset released by Klarner et al. (2012).
I restrict attention to single-member districts, which cover roughly eighty percent of all
general election races.10 As Panel C of Table 3.1 shows, an average of 1.8 candidates
run in legislative races. Incumbents run for re-election in about 77 percent of races and
are unopposed roughly one third of the time when they do. When facing challengers,
incumbents win more than 90 percent of their re-election bids and do so by an average
margin of more than 30 percentage points.
9Given this sampling approach, the states of Alaska, Nevada, North Dakota, and Wyoming have no residents
included in any of these three waves of the survey.
10Multi-member districts with positions posts (i.e. specific post positions are voted for) are included in this
category.
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3.4 Identification
I estimate how the impacts of open meetings vary with the average log distance of the state’s
population to the capital city using equations of the type:
Ysct = msc + qc  at + b1Msct + b2[Msct  Dsc] + X0sctl+ #sct (3.1)
where Ysct is an outcome of interest for state s in census region c in time period t. Msct is
an indicator variable for the passage of a legislative open meetings law and Dsc is the log
average distance of the population to the state capital as of 1950. State fixed effects, msc;
region-by-time-period fixed effects, qc  at; and Xsct, a vector of state-specific time varying
controls are included. I cluster standard errors at the state level.
The state fixed effects control for time-invariant differences at the state level and the
region-by-year fixed effects non-parametrically control for any differential trends occuring
at the level of region or higher. The basic state-year level controls are log state population,
log per capita income, an indicator for whether a gubernatorial election occurs in that time
period, and a set of variables capturing the structure and composition of state government:
sizes of the upper and lower houses, share democrat of each house, the proportion of
legislators across both houses that are the same party as the governor, and indicators for
divided government and the political affiliation of the governor. Specific to each set of
outcomes, additional controls may be included, and are described in the corresponding
section of the results.
As in Padró-i-Miquel et al. (2014), the empirical strategy is analogous to a triple
differences approach. Outcomes are compared (1) within states before and after open
meeting laws; (2) across states that adopt such laws and not; and (3) across states that have
more or less isolated capitals. In interpreting the estimates, b1 + b2  Dsc is the effect of
open meetings for a state with log average population distance to the capital Dsc, the value
of which ranges between 0.423 and 0.848 for the United States. In the results, I will focus on
the impact of open meetings at the average level of state capital isolation, b1 + b2  0.688, as
well as how the impacts vary with isolation, i.e. whether b2 is significantly different than
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zero. Finally, since open meetings adoption is not randomly assigned, following the main
results I consider an event-study specification which allows me to determine whether the
timing of open meetings adoption is correlated with differential pre-trends in outcomes at
the state level.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Legislative activity
In Table 3.2, I first examine whether the introduction of open meetings influenced the
behavior of legislators as reflected in the log numbers of bills introduced and enacted in
session and the lateness of state budgets.11 I find no evidence in column (1) of significant
average impacts on log introductions, or differences in impact by capital isolation. Turning
to log enactments in column (2), however, I observe a significant average decline of roughly
11 percent. This drop is concentrated in more isolated legislatures, where in states with
lower average log distance the impact becomes positive but insignificantly different from
zero.
Columns (3) and (4) examine whether open meetings influence the timeliness of state
budgets. Though no there are no significant impacts on the extensive margin of budget
lateness, column (4) shows that in states with low capital isolation, the average number of
days that budgets are late declines with open meetings. This effect significantly attenuates
as the isolation of the state capital increases, so that in more isolated locations open meetings
have no effect on either measure of timeliness.
11For the bill-related outcomes, regressions include additional controls for whether each two year period was
composed of annual (as opposed to biennial) sessions, whether for annual sessions bill consideration can carry
over across one session to the next, and whether for biennial sessions the session start year is odd versus even,
and whether for sessions that occur once every two years if an additional session can be called if necessary in
the second year. Additionally, estimation for bill-related outcomes is conducted using Poisson regressions with
the level form of variables (results are robust to the use of OLS with log form of variables). For budget lateness
outcomes, regressions include additional controls for whether the budget is annual or biennial, whether the
state has the line-item veto, whether a partial government shutdown is mandated if the budget is late, and the
log amounts of federal aid received for education, health and hospitals, public welfare, and other categories.
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Table 3.2: Legislative activity
Ln bills Ln bills Budget timeliness
introduced enacted Late (0/1) Days Late
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open meetings * Capital isolation 0.379 -1.129** 0.244 22.23*
(0.383) (0.469) (0.265) (11.74)
Open meetings -0.219 0.663** -0.166 -15.61**
(0.257) (0.327) (0.182) (7.57)
Observations 633 638 1,682 1,682
Effect: mean sample isolation 0.042 -0.114** 0.002 -0.35
(0.040) (0.054) (0.044) (2.89)
Effect: min sample isolation -0.058 0.185 -0.063 -6.20*
(0.1000 (0.135) (0.078) (3.42)
Effect: max sample isolation 0.103 -0.295*** 0.041 3.24
(0.081) (0.093) (0.065) (3.96)
Outcome mean [SD] 3,683.7 889.3 0.161 5.110
[4,367.0] [541.3] [0.367] [20.307]
State, Year*Region FE X X X X
Legislative controls X X X X
Population/income controls X X X X
Notes: All columns report estimates from regressions at the state level of the listed variable on an indicator
for open meetings interacted with state capital isolation as of 1950. Columns (1) and (2) are based on Poisson
regressions using the level form of outcomes, while columns (3) and (4) are OLS estimates. Regressions include
state and session-by-census-region (or year-by-census-region in columns (3) and (4)) fixed effects and controls
for log state population, log per capita income, an indicator for whether a gubernatorial election occurs in that
time period, sizes of the upper and lower houses, share democrat of each house, the proportion of legislators
across both houses that are the same party as the governor, and indicators for divided government and the
political affiliation of the governor. Columns (1) and (2) also control for whether each two year period was
composed of annual (as opposed to biennial) sessions, whether for annual sessions bill consideration can carry
over across one session to the next, and whether for biennial sessions the session start year is odd versus even,
and whether for sessions that occur once every two years if an additional session can be called if necessary in
the second year. Columns (3) and (4) also control for whether the budget is annual or biennial, whether the
state has the line-item veto, whether a partial government shutdown is mandated if the budget is late, and the
log amounts of federal aid received for education, health and hospitals, public welfare, and other categories.
Standard errors clustered at the state level. Additionally shown in each column are the implied effects of open
meetings at the average 1950 level of isolation observed in the data across states, as well as the minimum and
maximum values. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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3.5.2 State expenditure
Table 3.3 considers the effects of open meetings on log state government direct expenditure.12
Column (1) indicates that total expenditure increases by approximately 4 percent following
open meetings adoption, where insignificant differences in the effect by state isolation
cannot be rejected. In column (2), I consider the impact on expenditure for public goods.
Open meetings significantly increase public goods expenditure on average by more than 5
percent, and this effect is driven by larger impacts in more isolated areas, which spend less
on public goods to begin with.
Columns (3) through (5) consider the impacts of open meetings separately for each of the
public goods categories: health and hospitals, education, and public welfare. The pattern of
coefficients is similar in each case, with the effect of open meetings being relatively more
positive in states with more isolated governments, and the average impact is significantly
different from zero for both education and public welfare.
3.5.3 Confidence in government
While the previous sections have focused on the outcomes over which government officials
have direct influence, I next examine whether open meetings influence the opinions and
behavior of citizens.13 In Table 3.4, I ask if open meetings lead to changes in citizens’
confidence in state government, as captured by the Gallup Poll question on trust and
confidence in the state government’s ability to handle state level problems. Column (1)
presents estimates where the 4-point scale measure is used as an outcome, showing a
significant average increase of 0.3 points, where higher values signify increased confidence.
The coefficient on the interaction of open meetings with capital isolation is insignificant but
suggestive of the effect being weaker in states with greater isolation. When considering as
12Regressions include additional controls for the shares of the population age 15 and below and age 65 and
older, as well for the log amounts of federal aid received for education, health and hospitals, public welfare,
and other categories. Also included is an indicator variable for the presence court-ordered school finance
equalization (SFE) programs.
13Regressions additionally include a control for the share of the population 18 and older.
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Table 3.3: State direct expenditure
Public Health/ Public
Total goods hospitals Education welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Open meetings * Capital isolation 0.017 0.586** 0.248 0.373** 2.056
(0.175) (0.230) (0.497) (0.156) (1.499)
Open meetings 0.031 -0.347** -0.169 -0.203* -1.128
(0.121) (0.159) (0.355) (0.106) (0.994)
Observations 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350
Effect: mean sample isolation 0.042* 0.056* 0.002 0.054* 0.287*
(0.021) (0.032) (0.046) (0.031) (0.161)
Effect: min sample isolation 0.038 -0.099 -0.064 -0.045 -0.258
(0.050) (0.067) (0.149) (0.046) (0.380)
Effect: max sample isolation 0.045 0.150*** 0.041 0.113** 0.616*
(0.036) (0.051) (0.083) (0.043) (0.327)
Outcome mean [SD] 15.748 14.976 13.167 14.119 13.863
1.078] [1.195] [1.219] [1.097] [1.584]
State, Year*Region FE X X X X X
Legislative controls X X X X X
Population/income controls X X X X X
Federal aid controls X X X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the state level of the log of state direct expenditure
in the listed category on an indicator for open meetings interacted with state capital isolation as of 1950.
Public goods is the sum of health/hospitals, education, and public welfare. Regressions include state and
year-by-census-region fixed effects and, in addition to those listed in Table 3.2, controls for shares of the
population age 15 and below and age 65 and older, as well for the log amounts of federal aid received for
education, health and hospitals, public welfare, and other categories. Also included is an indicator variable for
the presence court-ordered school finance equalization (SFE) programs. Standard errors clustered at the state
level. Additionally shown in each column are the implied effects of open meetings at the average 1950 level of
isolation observed in the data across states, as well as the minimum and maximum values. *Significant at 10
percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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the outcome an indicator for choosing the top two confidence categories, a significant 20
percent average increase is observed. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction term
becomes significantly negative, so that the large positive effect at low isolation becomes
insignificantly different from zero at high levels of log average distance.
To shed light on where in the distribution of initial confidence the effects are concentrated,
in columns (3) and (4) I examine whether there are significant shifts in the proportion of
individuals expressing the highest and lowest levels of confidence following open meetings.
I find no effects for the highest confidence category, but observe a great deal of heterogeneity
in the effect of open meetings when the lowest category is considered as an outcome. At
low values of capital isolation, open meetings leads to large and significant shifts away from
the lowest category. In contrast, at high levels of isolation, the likelihood that respondents
express the lowest level of confidence increases significantly with open meetings.
These results are consistent with a setting in which open meetings lead to changes in the
information levels of citizens across different levels of isolation. The opposite direction of
the effects in states with low and high isolation suggest that the public is not only reacting
to the passage of open meetings laws per se, but to the content of what they reveal.
3.5.4 Candidate and voter behavior
Though the results thus far indicate that open meetings lead to meaningful impacts on
public perception of state government, another question is whether these shifts in opinion
actually lead to changes in voting behavior, or whether the decisions of incumbents and
challengers to run for office are affected, in races for the houses of state legislatures.14
Appendix Table C.1 presents the estimates of the impact of open meetings on the number of
candidates, whether the incumbent runs for re-election, and if any non-incumbents run for
office. For none of these variables are significant average effects, or differences in impact by
log average distance, observed.
14Regressions additionally include a control for the share of the population 18 and older and fixed effects at
the district (i.e. capturing a specific position within a house) rather than state level.
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Table 3.4: Confidence in state government
4-point 0-1 indicator
scale Confident Highest Lowest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open meetings * Capital isolation -2.942 -1.561* -0.034 1.347**
(1.887) (0.909) (0.678) (0.533)
Open meetings 2.323* 1.272* 0.063 -0.987**
(1.334) (0.645) (0.479) (0.381)
Observations 123 123 123 123
Effect: mean sample isolation 0.304* 0.201** 0.049 -0.063
(0.178) (0.086) (0.203) (0.050)
Effect: min sample isolation 1.077* 0.611** 0.034 -0.417**
(0.552) (0.268) (0.136) (0.160)
Effect: max sample isolation -0.173 -0.052 0.040 0.155*
(0.329) (0.157) (0.087) (0.089)
Outcome mean [SD] 2.930 0.771 0.208 0.049
[0.448] [0.222] [0.226] [0.118]
State, Year*Region FE X X X X
Legislative controls X X X X
Population/income controls X X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the state level of the listed variable on an indicator
for open meetings interacted with state capital isolation as of 1950. Regressions include state and year-by-
census-region fixed effects and, in addition to those listed in Table 3.2, controls for shares of the population age
18 and older. Outcomes are state-year level averages based on the question: “How much trust and confidence
do you have in the government of the state where you live when it comes to handling state problems?”, where
respondents were asked to respond on a 4-point scale ranging from (1) “None at all” to (4) “A great deal”.
Column (1) presents estimates where the 4-point scale measure is used as an outcome. Column (2) is an
indicator for choosing the top two confidence categories, while columns (3) and (4) are indicators for choosing
the highest and lowest levels of confidence. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Additionally shown in
each column are the implied effects of open meetings at the average 1950 level of isolation observed in the data
across states, as well as the minimum and maximum values. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.
104
Table 3.5 considers, conditional on incumbent presence, the impacts of open meetings
on voting. While no effects on log turnout or incumbents’ vote share and likelihood of
victory are observed on average, there exists significant heterogeneity in impacts by state
isolation. Column (1) shows that open meetings decrease turnout significantly in states with
low average log distance, but that this effect dampens as isolation increases, so that in high
isolation states the effects are no longer distinguishable from zero. Turning to column (2), I
observe that incumbents in states with highly isolated legislatures see a significant drop in
vote share, while those low isolation areas benefit from open meetings. Finally, the absence
of corresponding effects on incumbents’ likelihood of winning re-election is unsurprising
given how large are the margins of victory for incumbent legislators in state level elections.
Consistent with the results on confidence in government, the results further suggest that
open meetings lead to shifts in voters’ information and that they respond to its content.
If the absence of turnout effects in more isolated areas reflected simply that the de jure
increase in transparency from open meetings did not lead to any de facto increase in public
information, the decrease in incumbent vote share in these areas would not be expected.
3.5.5 Identification check: event-study
Given the empirical strategy in this paper, it is important to determine whether there exist
significant differential trends in outcomes between states with and without open meetings
laws prior to adoption. To do so I use the following regression:
Ysct = msc + qc  at +å
t
btMt,sct +å
t
jt[Mt,sct  Dsc] + X0sctl+ #sct (3.2)
where Mt,sct is a vector of indicator variables for whether in state s period t falls t periods
relative to open meetings adoption. Observations in the period prior to open meetings
adoption (t =  1) serve as the reference group. All observations that occur three or more
periods prior to adoption are grouped together, as are all observations that are five or more
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Table 3.5: Voting outcomes
Ln voter Incumbent Incumbent
turnout vote share victory
(1) (2) (3)
Open meetings * Capital isolation 0.282* -0.121** -0.040
(0.163) (0.050) (0.095)
Open meetings -0.226** 0.079** 0.034
(0.111) (0.032) (0.064)
Observations 65,185 68,692 68,692
Effect: mean sample isolation -0.032 -0.005 0.005
(0.025) (0.005) (0.006)
Effect: min sample isolation -0.106** 0.027** 0.016
(0.047) (0.012) (0.024)
Effect: max sample isolation 0.013 -0.024** -0.002
(0.038) (0.012) (0.019)
Outcome mean [SD] 9.447 0.759 0.939
[0.960] [0.198] [0.239]
State, Region*Year FE X X X
Legislative controls X X X
Population/income controls X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the district level of the listed variable on an
indicator for open meetings interacted with state capital isolation as of 1950. Regressions include district and
period-by-census-region fixed effects and, in addition to those listed in Table 3.2, controls for shares of the
population age 18 and older and number of candidates. Sample restricted to observations with an incumbent
running for re-election. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Additionally shown in each column are the
implied effects of open meetings at the average 1950 level of isolation observed in the data across states, as well
as the minimum and maximum values. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1
percent.
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periods after adoption.15 For non-adopting states, Mt,sct is set to zero for all t, to assist in
the identification of the fixed effects and control coefficients (Greenstone and Hanna, 2014).
Other variables remain unchanged from the baseline equation.
Inspection for negative values of t of the pattern of estimates of the impact of open
meetings at a given level D of state capital isolation in period t, bt + jt  D, allows me
to establish whether there exist significant pre-trends in outcomes. This analysis, however,
excludes the government confidence variables, for which only three time periods are
available.
Returning the event study results, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot, both for the minimum and
maximum values of D among the U.S. states, the estimated impact of open meetings over
time for each outcome where significant effect heterogeneity by log average distance was
observed previously. The 95 percent confidence intervals are also included. Reassuringly,
for none of the five outcomes, at either high or low values of D, are significant impacts of
open meetings observed in periods prior to adoption. In addition, examining the pattern of
post-period coefficients allows for an assessment of whether the impacts of open meetings
are short-lived or persistent. The plots demonstrate that across the legislative, expenditure,
and election outcomes, the effects of open meetings do not attenuate significantly over time.
3.6 Conclusion
The findings of this paper suggest that open meetings in the U.S. state legislative setting
are on average beneficial. Expenditure on public goods increases, especially in areas where
spending of this type is the lowest to start. Additionally, citizens express greater confidence,
at least in the short run, in the ability of state governments.
The results also indicate that even in environments with low initial levels of accountability,
open meetings have significant impacts. That is, weak transmission mechanisms to the
public or low uptake by citizens do not appear to be binding constraints which prevent
15Given the timing of the bulk of the adoptions of open meetings, a larger number of post- than pre-periods
are generally available.
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increased accessibility of information about legislator behavior from producing downstream
effects.
The observed drop in voter turnout in states with less isolated capitals after open
meetings contrasts with the results of a number of papers examining the voting effects of
increasing the provision of information about elected officials. Stromberg (2004) finds a 1.2
percent increase in votes per capita in U.S. gubernatorial elections for a 10 percent increase in
county radio penetration between 1920 and 1930. Snyder and Stromberg (2010) estimate an
increase in turnout for national House elections associated with greater congruence between
newspaper and political markets. In the Indian election setting, Banerjee et al. (2011) find
that the provision of report cards with information on incumbent performance yields a
3.5 percent rise in voter turnout. It should be noted however that the model of voting in
the latter paper also suggests that the impact on turnout of increasing voter information
may critically depend on the distribution of priors. For example, if open meetings lead the
perceptions of citizens previously opposed to an incumbent to improve, they may shift to
being indifferent between candidates, no longer view voting as having a positive expected
value, and choose not to vote.
Finally, a limitation of this paper is that it does not provide evidence on shifts in the
content of media coverage, which is implicitly assumed to be the link between open meetings
and the observed changes in citizen confidence and voting behavior. Unfortunately, the time
period during which the majority of the changes in open meetings took place (the 1970s) is
one for which there is limited searchable newspaper data systematically available across a
large number of states. If data of this type were to become available in the future, testing
for changes in the media coverage of state politics would be a useful extension.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Survey sampling
A.1.1 Registered voters survey
Polling stations in urban areas, where locating specific individuals based on the information
available in the electoral roll would not have been feasible, were excluded from the sample
(8.3 percent). Additionally excluded were polling stations with only three election officers
(0.7 percent), as were polling stations that were split across a main polling station and an
extension station (9.8 percent). The list of registered voters was at the (main+extension) level,
so it was not possible to determine to which of the main station or extension individuals
were assigned. The only difference between having a main and extension station versus two
polling stations in the same location is whether the threshold for maximum registered voters
at a single station was reached after the formal yearly deadline to split polling stations.
Administration is otherwise identical.
In some locations, fewer than three Muslims or two Yadavs were identified in the list. If
too few Muslims were available, Yadavs were randomly drawn to fill the positions when
possible, and vice versa. If fewer than five Muslims and Yadavs in total were identified,
individuals that were neither Muslim nor Yadav were randomly drawn to fill the position.
Seasonal migration is common in the survey area and the electoral rolls contain errors
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(e.g. listed individuals may be duplicates or have moved and registered at another polling
station without being deleted from the list at the previous station). Therefore, randomly
drawn backup respondents were also identified for each primary respondent. In the final
sample, 36.6 percent of respondents were from the primary sample, 22.6 percent were the
first backup, 14.6 percent were the second backup, 11.2 percent were the third backup,
and 15 percent were fourth backup or higher. These rates of replacement are similar to
those of other surveys in the region which identified respondents based on the electoral roll
(Banerjee 2014). The rate of primary versus backup respondents does not differ significantly
by whether the polling station is mixed versus homogeneous team. The consent rate among
located respondents was very high, with more than 98.5 percent of individuals agreeing to
participate. If an individual indicated that they did not go to the polling station to attempt
to vote on election day, the next backup individual was then substituted.
A.1.2 Election officers survey
A total of 6,251 officers served at polling stations during the 2014 election in the district in
which the survey was conducted. Out of these officers, 6,045 had phone numbers listed in
the administrative data which were not obviously incorrect (i.e. having the wrong number
of digits or all zero numerals). Of these 6,045 individuals, 614 officers were inferred as
Muslim or Yadav. Each of these individuals was attempted to be reached by phone. One non-
Muslim/Yadav officer was randomly selected for calling from each of the mixed composition
teams of which the previous 614 Muslim/Yadav officers were a member. If the officer could
not be reached or did not consent, another non-Muslim, non-Yadav officer was selected as
a replacement, if possible. An additional 600 homogeneous polling teams were randomly
chosen and an officer from within the team was randomly selected. Again, if the officer
could not be reached or did not consent, another officer was selected as a replacement,
if possible. A total of 2,350 officers were called in total. In 30 percent of instances the
individual was not reachable (in the vast majority of cases due to the listed phone number
not being functional). Willingness to participate was very high among the officers who were
120
reachable, with only 2 percent (33) of officers not consenting to be surveyed in the future.
Calling yielded 380 mixed team polling stations with at least one Muslim/Yadav officer
and non-Muslim/Yadav officer each confirmed as consenting and 436 homogeneous polling
stations with at least one officer confirmed as consenting, from which 305 mixed team and
homogeneous pollling stations each were randomly selected as described in the main text.
A.2 Vignette experiment names and list experiments prompt
A.2.1 Vignette experiment names
Muslim: Najam Uddin, Mustak Ansari, Mohammed Alam
Yadav: Ajay Yadav, Kailesh Yadav, Surendra Yadav
Brahmin: Arjun Tripathi, Rohit Mishra, Alok Chaturvedi
A.2.2 List experiments prompt
“I’m going to read you a list of various statements, and I would like for you to tell me
how many of them occurred during the previous 2014 Lok Sabha election. Please, count to
yourself. Do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY IN TOTAL. For example, it might
be that none of them occurred, all of them occurred, or any number in between.”
A.3 Counterfactual calculation details
The total estimated effect on the RJD-BJP vote share margin of shifting to a mixed composi-
tion polling team is the sum of the within-station effect and the cross-station spillover effect
multiplied by the number of neighbor polling stations, adjusting for the sub-constituency
level of voter identity card coverage, IDc. Using available sub-constituency-level adminis-
trative data for the entire state of Bihar, I calculate the average number of neighbors for a
polling station in each sub-constituency, Nc. Taking the coefficients from a modified version
of equation (1.2) allowing for heterogeneity by identity card coverage, estimated on the
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sample districts for which I possess officer assignment information:
Ypc = mc + qo + bMixedpc + gTpc + fNpc + b2

Mixedpc  IDc

+ g2

Tpc  IDc

+ f2

Npc  IDc

+ X0pcl+ epc
the impact of a change of magnitude, X, in the proportion of mixed polling stations in a
sub-constituency can be estimated as X  [(b+ g  Nc) + (b2 + g2  Nc)  IDc]. While I do
not observe the actual baseline proportion of mixed teams outside of my sample area, the
value of X needed to change the outcome of the race between the RJD and BJP coalitions
can be calculated using the formula above together with the constituency level margins of
victory. When calculating impacts at the parliamentary constituency level, I take a weighted
average (based on number of polling stations) across the sub-constituencies within that
parliamentary constituency. The impacts of alternative team composition scenarios can then
be assessed based on the range within which one assumes the baseline proportion of mixed
team polling stations in each constituency falls. I assume that the baseline proportion in all
sub-constituencies is the same as that in the observable sample, 0.324.
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A.4 Supplemental figures and tables
Figure A.1: Example of polling officer team during election day proceedings
Figure A.2: Example of government-issued voter identity card
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Figure A.3: Example of neighboring polling stations in close proximity
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Notes: Figure plots the empirical cumulative distribution function of the absolute value of the parliamentary-
constituency-level vote share margin between the RJD and BJP coalitions, for the 29 of 40 races where these two
coalitions fielded the top two candidates.
Figure A.4: Cumulative distribution function of coalition vote share margins
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Table A.1: Randomization check - spatial characteristics
Homog. Mixed
team team Difference p-value Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number mixed team neighbor stations 0.385 0.386 -0.012 0.493 5,561
[0.746] [0.719] (0.018)
Total neighbor stations 1.200 1.191 -0.027 0.420 5,561
[1.614] [1.647] (0.034)
Number mixed team stations 0.420 0.452 0.026 0.392 5,097
within 0.25km [1.078] [1.159] (0.030)
Number mixed team stations 2.536 2.622 0.066 0.430 5,097
within 0.25-0.75km [4.263] [4.470] (0.084)
Total stations within 0.25km 1.357 1.336 -0.025 0.735 5,097
[2.930] [2.904] (0.073)
Total stations within 0.25-0.75km 7.893 7.958 0.069 0.768 5,097
[12.830] [12.904] (0.232)
Number mixed team stations 1.210 1.309 0.043 0.607 3,231
within village [2.178] [2.287] (0.083)
Number mixed team stations 4.688 4.829 -0.040 0.768 3,216
in neighboring villages [3.908] [4.015] (0.136)
Total stations within village 3.686 3.812 0.088 0.676 3,231
[5.551] [5.868] (0.212)
Total stations in neighboring villages 14.259 14.479 0.065 0.861 3,216
[10.694] [10.544] (0.369)
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report variable means with standard deviations in brackets for homogeneous and
mixed officer teams. Column (3) reports the coefficient from an OLS regression where the listed outcome is
regressed on an indicator for polling station mixed team composition and column (4) reports the associated
p-value. Also included are sub-constituency and number of officer fixed effects. Neighbor stations are polling
stations within the same building/compound of a given polling station. Stations with 0.25 and within 0.25-
0.75km are non-neighbor stations within 0.25km and 0.25-0.75km of a given polling station, respectively.
Numbers of stations within a village and in neighboring villages are the numbers of non-neighbor polling
stations within the same village as a given polling station and in villages adjacent to a given polling station’s
village, respectively. Sample is restricted to those polling stations matched to the dataset of polling station GPS
locations. Village-related outcomes further exclude stations in villages which are in the top 1 percent of the
distribution in terms of number of polling stations contained within, or their neighboring villages.*Significant at
10% level **5% level ***1% level.
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Table A.2: Cross-position balance
Presiding Polling Polling Polling Polling
officer officer 1 officer 2 officer 3 officer 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Muslim/Yadav presiding officer -0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.019 -0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.027)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 2 0.006 -0.004 0.014 -0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 3 -0.003 -0.018 0.012 -0.020
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.029)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 4 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.017
(0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.025)
Observations 5,561 5,561 5,561 5,523 1,178
Notes: Each column reports coefficients from an OLS regression where the outcome is Muslim/Yadav assignment
to the specified position, and is regressed on dummies for Muslim/Yadav assignment to the other polling officer
team positions specified in table. Additionally included are sub-constituency and number of officer fixed effects.
*Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.3: Position- and number-specific impacts on voting outcomes
Vote share
Ln votes Ln votes margin Ln total
RJD BJP RJD-BJP votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Position
Muslim/Yadav presiding officer -0.006 -0.017 0.007 -0.012
(0.052) (0.043) (0.020) (0.018)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 1 0.088* -0.013 0.031* 0.017
(0.050) (0.037) (0.019) (0.011)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 2 0.050 -0.064 0.021 0.002
(0.052) (0.044) (0.020) (0.014)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 3 0.054 -0.086** 0.037* 0.000
(0.050) (0.040) (0.019) (0.019)
Muslim/Yadav polling officer 4 0.111 -0.001 0.041 0.001
(0.189) (0.170) (0.087) (0.033)
F-test p-value: equality of coeffs. 0.731 0.612 0.824 0.614
Observations 5,276 5,290 5,293 5,293
Panel B. Number
Any Muslim/Yadav officer 0.055* -0.046** 0.027** 0.002
(0.028) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008)
Multiple Muslim/Yadav officers -0.061 0.040 -0.024 -0.010
(0.061) (0.053) (0.024) (0.018)
Observations 5,535 5,535 5,549 5,549
Notes: All columns in Panel A report OLS estimates from regressions at the polling station level of the listed
variable on indicators for Muslim/Yadav presence in each polling party position, conditional on there being 1 or
fewer total MY officers at the polling station. All columns in Panel B report OLS estimates from regressions at the
polling station level of the listed variable on indicators for the degree of Muslim/Yadav presence. Additionally
included in all regressions are sub-constituency and number of officer fixed effects and controls for the log
number of registered voters at the polling station and the Muslim/Yadav share of registered voters *Significant
at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.4: Heterogeneity in impacts of team composition by electorate composition
Vote share
Ln votes Ln votes margin Ln total
RJD BJP RJD-BJP votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed team 0.038 -0.023 0.018 0.003
(0.037) (0.027) (0.014) (0.010)
Mixed team * Muslim/Yadav
registered voter % 0.057 -0.131 0.039 -0.014
(0.158) (0.166) (0.053) (0.039)
Muslim/Yadav registered voter % 0.031*** -0.029*** 0.015*** -0.000*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 5,535 5,549 5,552 5,552
Notes: Each column reports OLS estimates from regressions at the polling station level of the listed outcome
on indicators for mixed team composition, interacted with a continuous measure of the polling station level
proportion of registered voters that are Muslim or Yadav. Additionally included are sub-constituency and
number of officer fixed effects and a control for log total registered voters. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant
at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.5: Cross-station spillovers - extended range
Vote share
Ln votes Ln votes margin Ln total
RJD BJP RJD-BJP votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Buffer radius
Mixed team composition 0.062** -0.060*** 0.033** -0.001
(0.028) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008)
Number mixed team neighbor 0.024 -0.049** 0.026*** -0.001
stations (0.026) (0.020) (0.010) (0.008)
Number mixed team stations 0.012 0.014 -0.006 -0.004
within 0.25km (0.026) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007)
Number mixed team stations -0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.000
within 0.25-0.75km (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Total neighbor stations -0.028** 0.028*** -0.021*** -0.011***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003)
Total stations within 0.25km -0.028** 0.007 -0.007** -0.006**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Total stations within 0.25-0.75km 0.001 0.007*** -0.003* 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 5,074 5,087 5,090 5,090
Number locations 3,307 3,307 3,307 3,307
Panel B. Village boundaries
Mixed team composition 0.083** -0.070** 0.037** 0.010
(0.038) (0.031) (0.015) (0.010)
Number mixed team neighbor 0.069 -0.108*** 0.048** 0.011
stations (0.054) (0.041) (0.019) (0.011)
Number mixed team stations -0.017 -0.044 0.010 -0.003
within village (0.039) (0.029) (0.016) (0.008)
Number mixed team stations 0.008 -0.020* 0.009 0.004
in neighboring villages (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003)
Total neighbor stations -0.033 0.102*** -0.044*** -0.001
(0.033) (0.026) (0.012) (0.010)
Total stations within village 0.016 0.016 -0.004 -0.000
(0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003)
Total stations in neighboring 0.000 0.011** -0.004* 0.000
villages (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 3,196 3,210 3,212 3,212
Number villages 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,247
Notes: Each column within a panel reports OLS estimates from a regression at the polling station level of the
listed variable on an indicator for mixed team composition. Each regression includes sub-constituency and
number of officer fixed effects and controls for log total registered voters and share Muslim/Yadav registered
voters. Neighbor stations are those within the same building/compound of a given polling station. Stations
within 0.25 and 0.25-0.75km are non-neighbor stations within the stated distance of a given polling station.
Numbers of stations within a village and in neighboring villages are the numbers of non-neighbor polling
stations within the same village as a given station and in villages adjacent to a given station’s village. Panel
A is restricted to stations matched to the dataset of station GPS locations. Panel B further excludes stations
in the top 1 percent of villages in terms of number of stations contained within, or their neighboring villages.
*Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.6: Type-specific impacts of officer identity on voting outcomes
Vote share
Ln votes Ln votes margin Ln total
RJD BJP RJD-BJP votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Muslim officer 0.051* -0.034 0.023** 0.011
(0.030) (0.024) (0.012) (0.008)
Any Yadav officer 0.070 -0.100** 0.044** -0.033
(0.057) (0.044) (0.022) (0.025)
Muslim/Yadav registered voter % 0.031*** -0.030*** 0.015*** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln total electors 1.007*** 1.198*** -0.069*** 0.934***
(0.062) (0.050) (0.024) (0.019)
Control Mean [SD] 4.451 5.143 -0.181 6.180
[1.198] [0.969] [0.452] [0.402]
Observations 5,276 5,290 5,293 5,293
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the polling station level of the listed variable on
indicators for Muslim and Yadav presence, conditional on there being 1 or fewer total Muslim/Yadav officers
at the polling station. Additionally included are sub-constituency and number of officer fixed effects and
controls for Muslim/Yadav share of registered voters and log total registered voters. *Significant at 10 percent.
**Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.7: Cross-election impacts of randomized team composition on voting outcomes
Vote share
Ln votes Ln votes margin Ln total
RJD BJP RJD-BJP votes
2015 2015 2015 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed team -0.016 -0.012 0.001 0.004
(0.043) (0.043) (0.020) (0.012)
Number mixed team neighbor stations 0.005 -0.067 0.035 0.025
(0.058) (0.058) (0.025) (0.015)
Total number neighbor stations -0.107*** -0.011 -0.045*** -0.054***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.015) (0.009)
Muslim/Yadav elector % 0.020*** -0.026*** 0.013*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln total electors 0.969*** 0.858*** 0.015 0.819***
(0.146) (0.147) (0.062) (0.047)
Observations 1,335 1,332 1,335 1,335
Number locations 1,008 1,007 1,008 1,008
Homogeneous team mean [SD] 5.096 5.106 -0.010 6.243
[0.908] [0.973] [0.433] [0.321]
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the polling station level of the listed variable from
the 2015 elections on an indicator for mixed team composition and variables for the numbers of total and mixed
composition team neighboring polling stations in the 2014 elections. Additionally included are AC and number
of officer fixed effects and controls for Muslim/Yadav share of registered voters and log total registered voters
from 2014. Neighbor stations are polling stations within the same location (building/compound) as a given
polling station. Standard errors clustered at the location level. The sample is restricted to the district where only
minor changes were made to the polling station locations between the 2014 and 2015 elections. *Significant at 10
percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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Table B.1: Differential initial trends check
State level
Difference in
log contract
value
(1)
Panel A. India
E-procurement 0.0130
(0.0378)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.202
(0.697)
Observations 24
Panel B. Indonesia - Works Projects
E-procurement (IV) -0.084
(0.115)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.086
(0.490)
Observations 24
Panel C. Indonesia - Consultancy Projects
E-procurement (IV) 0.017
(0.235)
Mean Dep. Var. -0.576
(0.790)
Observations 21
Notes: India - Column (1) reports an OLS estimate at the state level, where the dependent variable is the
difference in log average contract value between 2000 and 2001. The independent variable is the year of official
adoption of electronic procurement at the state level, conditional on adoption occurring after 2001. Indonesia -
Column (1) reports OLS estimates at the state level, where the dependent variable is the difference in log average
contract value between 2005 and 2004. The independent variable is the year of official adoption of electronic
procurement at the state level, conditional on adoption occurring after 2005. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses below estimates. Non-e-procurement project means for each dependent variable are also reported,
with standard deviations in parentheses. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1
percent.
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Table C.1: Candidate entry
Non-
Number incumbent Incumbent
candidates present present
(1) (2) (3)
Open meetings * Capital isolation -0.106 0.126 0.015
(0.241) (0.159) (0.119)
Open meetings 0.041 -0.100 0.007
(0.165) (0.105) (0.075)
Observations 89,347 89,347 89,347
Effect: mean sample isolation -0.032 -0.013 0.018
(0.030) (0.020) (0.014)
Effect: min sample isolation -0.004 -0.047 0.014
(0.067) (0.041) (0.027)
Effect: max sample isolation -0.049 0.007 0.020
(0.051) (0.036) (0.029)
Outcome mean [SD] 1.775 0.730 0.769
[0.621] [0.444] [0.421]
State, Region*Year FE X X X
Legislative controls X X X
Population/income controls X X X
Notes: All columns report OLS estimates from regressions at the state level of the listed variable on an indicator
for open meetings interacted with state capital isolation as of 1950. Regressions include district and period-by-
census-region fixed effects and, in addition to those listed in Table 3.2, controls for shares of the population age
18 and older. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Additionally shown in each column are the implied
effects of open meetings at the average 1950 level of isolation observed in the data across states, as well as the
minimum and maximum values. *Significant at 10 percent. **Significant at 5 percent. ***Significant at 1 percent.
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